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Introduction
The topic of ‘unresolved conflicts’ has received 
increased attention both in ‘high’ politics and 
academia as a result of the Caucasus crisis of mid-
August 2008. Within the territory of the former 
Soviet Union, four regional conflicts are defined 
as ‘unresolved’: Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While ethnicity plays 
a critical role in the latter three, the former is often 
viewed as a primarily economic dispute (although 
it also has an ethnic dimension). Breaking out 
between 1988 and 1992, all four conflicts ended 
with the creation of unrecognised states. While 
Russia was the first actor to become involved in 
the South Caucasus and the Moldova/Transnistria 
conflicts, the European Union’s (EU) engagement 
in the region has become visible only in the 21st 
century.
Originally portrayed as ‘frozen conflicts’, 
after the Caucasus crisis these disputes should, 
according to Uwe Halbach, be referred as 
“unresolved separatist conflicts in the post-Soviet 
region” (Halbach 2008: 22). EU officials more 
frequently use the term ‘protracted conflicts’.1 
Meanwhile, even before the August war, the 
conflicts had been ‘frozen’ only to outsiders. 
The observation made by Elkhan Nuriyev, an 
Azerbaijani expert, with regard to the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, is also relevant for the other 
Caucasus disputes: “the conflict itself is alive, 
since people are still dying in sporadic fighting at 
the ceasefire line” (Nuriyev 2007: 10). Moreover, 
as it will be shown in this paper, the conflicts over 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia began ‘unfreezing’ 
long before August 2008.
This paper attempts to contribute to the 
hotly disputed topic of international conflict 
management in the post-Soviet space. Conflict 
management is here referred to as the actions of 
states and unions of states, and their separate and 
joint efforts aimed at the pacification of conflicts. 
Such actions can include states assuming a 
mediating role, exercising leverage on the parties 
1 The European Commission and Secretariat of the Council of the 
EU, interviews by author, 8-9 March 2010, Brussels, Belgium.
involved and creating incentives for settlement 
(Coppieters 2007: 27). As regards the EU’s and 
Russia’s respective roles in conflict management 
in the post-Soviet space, several distinctions have 
to be made. Formally, Russia can be understood as 
an external actor when considering these conflicts. 
As it will be shown in this paper, Russia has been 
represented in all international mediating formats, 
in addition to Russian peacekeeping forces 
having been sent to three of the four conflicts. 
Meanwhile, on the ground, Russia has never 
been an impartial actor, not only in the sense that 
it has been biased in dealing with the conflicting 
parties, but also because the conflicts have had 
strong internal implications for Russia itself (due 
to its geographic proximity, economic ties, and 
the presence of Russian citizens in the zones of 
conflict). In August 2008, Russia openly clashed 
with Georgia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Nevertheless, even while expressing strong critic 
over Russia’s actions, experts have to recognise 
that in practice, Russia cannot be excluded from 
international mediating efforts in the post-Soviet 
region. Thus, with certain limitations, Russia’s 
role can be understood as that of an external actor.
Unlike Russia, the EU has made an effort to be 
impartial in its approach towards the conflicting 
parties. Meanwhile, due to its own limitations 
(e.g. the EU’s fear that secessionists may take 
an example from the Kosovo precedent), the 
EU has been cautious in establishing a dialogue 
with the secessionist entities on the ground. This 
fact considerably limits both the EU’s leverage 
over the breakaway entities, and thus the EU’s 
contribution to conflict management. Finally, 
before, as well as after, August 2008 the EU and 
Russia have made attempts to include the issue 
of conflict management on the common political 
agenda, even if such interaction has not resulted 
in a breakthrough in conflict settlement. In this 
regard, the EU and Russia can both be understood 
as third parties trying to mediate the conflicts.
Within the field of EU foreign policy, the 
EU’s role in conflict areas has been a subject of 
considerable preoccupation. While in terms of 
practical policy the EU has institutionalised its 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 
adopted a number of core security documents 
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including the European Security Strategy (ESS), 
and developed relevant instruments for deploying 
EU missions in various parts of the world, in the 
academic arena a number of researchers have taken 
these developments as reason to examine the EU’s 
growing actorness in civilian and/or military crisis 
management. This has mainly taken the form of 
case studies of conflict resolution in the Balkans 
and Africa, since the EU has been particularly 
active in these regions.2 Only few studies relate 
to the EU’s approach towards the post-Soviet 
secessionist conflicts. These can be divided in 
two groups: one analysing the EU’s role ‘from the 
inside out’ (Barbe/Kienzle 2007; Coppieters 2007; 
German 2007; Popescu 2005, 2007; Coppieters 
et al. 2004), and the other focusing on local 
actors’ perceptions of the EU’s activities in the 
region (Alieva 2006; Nuriyev 2007). The EU‘s 
involvement in resolving the regional conflicts 
in the common neighbourhood with Russia has 
frequently been characterised as “hesitant” at best 
(E. Stewart 2008b: 1) or even “reluctant” (Popescu 
2009: 457). Moreover, according to experts, the 
political leaders of the countries with secessionist 
conflicts within their territories have followed 
the development of EU-Russian relations, and 
interpreted the EU’s “Russia-first” approach as a 
signal that “the EU’s involvement in the conflict 
resolution is not serious enough” (Kratochvil/
Lippert 2008: 3).
Russia’s experience in conflict management 
in the territory of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) has not produced a 
very diverse response in academic studies. In the 
West, it has traditionally been stated that Russia 
is only interested in maintaining the status quo 
– the frozen status of the conflicts (Lynch 2006: 
3; Popescu 2006a: 7). Academically reputable 
2 See, for example, Mace, Catriona (2004): “Operation Concordia: 
Developing a ‘European’ Approach to Crisis management?” 
International Peacekeeping 11(3): 474-490; Youngs, Richard 
(2006): “The EU and Conflict in West Africa.” European Foreign 
Affairs Review 11: 333-352; Emerson, Michael/Eva Gross (eds.) 
(2007): Evaluating the EU’s Crisis Missions in the Balkans. 
Brussels: CEPS; Merlingen, Michael/Rasa Ostrauskaite (2005): 
“ESDP Police Missions: Meaning, Context, and Operational 
Challenges.” European Foreign Affairs Review 10: 215-235; 
Gibert, Marie (2007): “Monitoring a region in crisis: the European 
Union in West Africa.” Chaillot Paper 96. Paris: European Union 
Institute for Security Studies.
studies in Russia have also been quite critical 
towards Russia‘s policy in the CIS in general, 
and its involvement in conflict resolution in 
particular (e.g. Bolshakov 2008: 34; Oznobischev 
2008; Hrustalev 2007). Only a few scholars have 
called for closer cooperation between Russia, 
the EU and the United States (US) on conflict 
management (Suhov 2006: 117; Trenin 2006: 17). 
It should also be noted that most of the existing 
publications are predominantly empirical and that 
there are very few notable exceptions to this, in 
which the authors theoretically conceptualise 
the EU’s and Russia’s approaches towards the 
secessionist conflicts in the post-Soviet space 
(Bolshakov 2009; Coppieters 2007). This may be 
explained by the fact that policy-oriented studies 
in Russia predominate over theoretical research 
in the field of foreign policy. As far as the EU’s 
experience in conflict resolution is concerned, it is 
also ‘under theorised’. This is due to a number of 
reasons, such as the lack of comparative analyses 
of EU actions across various cases and the lack 
of theoretical studies of the EU’s role in conflict 
resolution outside enlargement countries (Popescu 
2009: 459-461).  
As the following analysis will show, the EU and 
Russia have pursued their own policies towards 
secessionist conflicts, while neglecting issues on 
the common agenda. Against this background, the 
approaches and efforts of both actors have often 
been studied separately. The EU’s involvement 
in managing regional conflicts in the CIS has 
been studied mainly by European experts, while 
Russia’s role has received the attention of Russian 
scholars. Some exceptions are the studies of Uwe 
Halbach and Nicu Popescu (Halbach 2005, 2008; 
Popescu 2005, 2006a, 2007, 2009), who have 
conducted research on both the European and 
Russian experiences, but without contrasting or 
comparing them in a single analysis. In addition, 
an edited volume (Coppieters/Legvold 2005) 
including separate chapters on Russia’s role in 
the conflict in Abkhazia (written by Antonenko, a 
Russian scholar), the troubled Russian-Georgian 
relationship (contribution of Devdariani, a 
Georgian expert), and security in Georgia and the 
role of the West (a joint contribution of Gogia, a 
Georgian author and Helly, a French scholar) has 
SPES Policy Papers 2011
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been published. 
However, there has been no lack of general 
studies looking at EU-Russia relations. Indeed, 
the contrasting interests of the EU and Russia in 
the so called common neighbourhood has become 
a common narrative (Popescu/Wilson 2009; 
Leonard/Popescu 2007; Lynch 2005; S. Stewart 
2009; Aghayev 2009; Halbach 2005; Allison et 
al. 2006; Light 2008). A very prominent analytical 
framework suggests that there is an obvious values’ 
gap between the EU as a post-modern normative 
power and traditionalist Russia acting as a realist 
power with zero-sum thinking (Lynch 2005a: 
17; Barbe/Kienzle 2007: 534). This argument is 
used to explain both Russia’s competitive attitude 
towards the EU (and the absence of such an 
attitude vice versa) in the shared neighbourhood, 
as well as Russian attempts to keep this region as 
its traditional sphere of influence. Russia’s active 
intervention in the 2004 elections in Ukraine, its 
attempts to restrict its neighbours’ sovereignty 
and exercise political pressure, its assertive policy 
towards Georgia, trade disputes with neighbours 
and the subsequent policy of trade bans – all these 
examples of “Moscow’s increasing assertiveness 
on a number of foreign policy issues” (Balfour/
Missiroli 2007) simply reiterate the conclusion 
that Russia acts according to the logic of a zero-
sum player. 
The Georgian-Russian war of August 2008 
brought about a new wave of publications. The 
main reaction to the Caucasus crisis came from 
leading experts (Allison 2008; Schroeder 2008; 
Dembinski et al. 2008; Akcakoca et al. 2009; 
Emerson 2008; Fischer 2008, 2009; Popescu 
2009). In addition, an international editorial 
team responded by establishing the Caucasus 
Analytical Digest, a monthly internet publication 
aimed at analysing the political, economic, and 
social situation in the three Caucasian states, with 
a special focus on the security dimension of the 
region.3 The academic debate provoked by the 
August war focused on four important issues: the 
provision of a critical reassessment of external 
actors’ previous involvement in conflict resolution 
3 See http://www.res.ethz.ch/analysis/cad/. As of December 2010, 
twenty two reports have been published.
efforts; the recognition of the EU’s competition 
with Russia in the post-Soviet space (both the 
scientific and applied research are ‘realist’ driven; 
the ‘value gap argument’ is practically absent in 
recently published studies); the analysis of the 
unresolved conflicts in the CIS in connection with 
debates on a broader security order in Europe; 
and finally, the necessity of renewed security 
cooperation with Russia by including the latter in 
key security institutions in Europe. 
To sum up, several problems in the existing 
studies need to be mentioned. First, before the war 
of August 2008, separate analyses of the EU’s and 
Russia’s role in conflict management in the post-
Soviet space had often led to general statements 
suggesting that little had been done by the relevant 
actors with regard to protracted conflicts. Such 
judgments have left three interrelated questions 
unanswered: Does this mean that the respective 
actor (the EU or Russia) has not invested sufficient 
resources and effort in the post-Soviet region in 
comparison with other parts of the world? Or does 
it mean that a certain player has achieved ‘little’ 
in comparison with another external actor? Or 
does it mean that virtually nothing has been done 
for the needs of the region in terms of conflict 
settlement? Second, ‘the value gap argument’, 
that is often used to explain Russia’s competitive 
behaviour, is not very helpful in explaining the 
EU’s own hesitant approach to the conflicts (e.g. 
why then does the EU exercise a ‘Russia-first’ 
approach, despite the value gap between the EU 
and Russia?). Finally, ‘the value gap argument’ 
seems to collide with recommendations that the 
EU and Russia should renew security cooperation 
in general, and coordinate their policies on the 
unresolved conflicts in particular. Meanwhile, 
these conclusions are dictated by the current 
reality: the inability of both actors to suggest 
solutions on their own and the very real danger 
that an escalation of these conflicts could pose 
to the prosperity and security of the common 
neighbourhood (proven by the war in Georgia), 
which is an indispensable part of the wellbeing of 
the European continent.  
The goal of this paper is to provide a 
comparative analysis of both EU and Russian 
policies towards secessionist conflicts, as well 
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as EU-Russian attempts at joint diplomacy in 
the region during the last decade. This paper is 
therefore not concerned with questions of the 
origin, evolution, historical roots and nature 
of the conflicts, which have already been paid 
considerable attention in various ethno-political 
studies.4 The main research question to be 
answered is: Which factors have hindered EU-
Russian cooperation in conflict management in 
the post-Soviet space over the past decade? The 
paper argues that both the EU’s and Russia’s 
approaches towards these conflicts show similar 
weaknesses and shortcomings. These weaknesses 
seem to stem from different interests in the 
region, the different natures of each actors’ own 
engagement in conflicts and the impact of external 
factors (such as political dynamics in the region, 
the role and involvement of other actors, etc.), 
and are not conducive to the cooperation of both 
actors in conflict management. This paper argues 
further that ‘the value gap argument’ has a certain 
explanatory limitation in illustrating the reasons 
for non-cooperation between the EU and Russia 
in conflict management and that other factors have 
to be taken into consideration, such as the lack 
of EU internal cohesion in defining policies, real 
competition between Russia and the EU in the 
common neighbourhood and Russian scepticism 
4 Broers, Laurence (ed.) (2005): The limits of leadership. Elites 
and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process. London: 
Conciliation Resources; Green, Elliott (2005): On the Endogenity 
of Ethnic Secessionist Groups. Development Studies Institute. 
London: London School of Economics; Hughes, James/
Gwendolyn Sasse (eds.) (2002): Ethnicity and Territory in the 
Former Soviet Union: Regions and Conflict. London: Frank 
Cass; King, Charles (2001): “The Benefits of Ethnic War. 
Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States.” World Politics 
53: 524–552; Ishiyama, J. (2000): “Institutions and Ethnopolitical 
Conflict in Post-Communist Politics.” Nationalism and Ethnic 
Politics 6 (3): 51-67; Kingston, Paul/Ian Spears (2004): States 
Within States – Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War 
Era. Birmingham; Zurcher, Christoph/Jan Koehler/Pavel Baev 
(2002): Internal Violence in the Caucasus – The Economics of 
Political and Common Violence. Washington, DC: The World 
Bank Development Economic Research Group; Coppieters, 
Bruno (ed.) (1996): Spornie granitsi na Kavkaze. Moscow: Ves’ 
Mir. http://poli.vub.ac.be./publi/ContBorders/rus/, last accessed 
28 August 2008; Koehler, Jan/Christoph Zurcher (eds.) (2003): 
Potentials of Dis/Order: Explaining Conflict and Stability in the 
Caucasus and in the Former Yugoslavia. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press; Zdravomislov, A. (1996): Mezhnatsionalnie 
konflikti v postsovetskom prostranstve. Moscow: Aspekt 
Press; Kavtaradze, S. (2005): Etnopoliticheskie konflikti na 
postsovetskom prostranstve. Moscow: Ekzamen. 
with regard to the EU’s common foreign policy. 
A decisive and crucial factor, which explains 
both the ineffectiveness of the EU’s and Russia’s 
respective policies and the lack of substance in 
joint work on the unresolved conflicts, relates to 
the fact that the goal of political conflict resolution 
per se has been substituted by the actors’ interest 
in avoiding negative consequences from a possible 
re-escalation of the conflicts.5 Therefore, this paper 
claims that despite each actor having its own set 
of limitations for a proactive policy towards the 
secessionist conflicts, both the EU and Russia have 
largely avoided searching for political solutions 
for a phased settlement of the conflicts. Thus, it 
is not surprising that both the EU and Russia 
have demonstrated limited political will for joint 
diplomacy with regard to the conflicts. 
The paper is composed of three main parts. 
The first part analyses Russian involvement in the 
conflicts since the 1990s, and argues that Russia’s 
attempts to contribute to conflict resolution were 
quite reluctant and did not break the negotiation 
deadlock in any of the four cases (chapter 1). 
The second part of the paper examines the EU’s 
engagement in conflict management. The EU’s 
hesitant policy in the region and the limited use 
of the tools at its disposal are explained by a set 
of internal and external constraints (chapter 2). 
The final part of the paper addresses the formal 
interaction between the EU and Russia on the 
unresolved conflicts in the shared neighbourhood 
before the Caucasus crisis of 2008. It also 
analyses the repercussions of this crisis on the 
EU-Russia dialogue on conflict management 
and discussions on a future model of European 
security (chapter 3). The paper concludes by 
summarising the weaknesses and shortcomings 
of both the EU’s and Russia’s policies towards 
the conflicts through a comparative lens. Policy 
recommendations are suggested, which could 
help to enhance the efficiency of EU-Russian joint 
conflict management in the region. 
5 The author thanks Dr. Bruno Coppieters for raising this aspect 
as one of possible perspectives. Prof. Dr. Bruno Coppieters, the 
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, interview by author, 9 March 2010, 
Belgium, Brussels.
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I Russia’s policies towards the 
unresolved conflicts in the post-Sovi-
et space 
Russia’s general approach  
Before analysing Russia’s involvement in each 
conflict separately, some common features of 
Russia’s stance on all four regional conflicts will 
be described. 
Russia has been involved in managing conflicts 
in Georgia, Moldova, and between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan since their escalation at the end of 
the 1980s and in the early 1990s. Russia’s policy 
towards the conflicts can be categorised as follows: 
(1) deployment of peacekeeping forces to the zones 
of conflict, and (2) participation in international 
mediation efforts. In academic studies Russian 
peacekeeping forces have received more attention 
than Russia’s involvement in political negotiations. 
Moreover, Russia is consistently criticised for its 
ineffectiveness and bias in terms of its support for 
separatists (Popescu 2006a: 2). It is important to 
remember that the existing formats of negotiations 
(see below), as well as peacekeeping forces, were 
set up in the 1990s, and that they were designed 
to stop violence. However, the peacekeepers were 
not supposed to find resolutions for the conflicts. 
On the one hand, historical, economic, political, 
and social ties between Russia and the countries of 
the post-Soviet space made Russian intervention 
in the conflicts in the 1990s foreseeable. On the 
other hand, Russia was very weak (economically 
and geostrategically) at this time and its new 
post-Soviet diplomacy was in the process of 
being formed. As such, Russia’s participation in 
conflict settlement had obvious shortcomings, 
but other international actors were not ready to 
become deeply involved in conflict management 
in the post-Soviet space. However, it is significant 
that despite the changes in the international 
environment, situations in the analysed countries, 
and even in Russia’s own domestic and foreign 
policies, there has been no serious revision of 
Russia’s diplomacy in the region since the 1990s. 
“Abandoning Yeltsin’s ‘near abroad’ doctrine 
has not meant that Moscow has abandoned all 
of its underlying assumptions” (Zagorski 2005: 
69). Russia has not been able to elaborate any 
serious, clear strategy in its relations with the 
CIS generally, and towards conflict resolution 
in particular. Rhetorically it has been stated that 
the CIS should be made the (top) priority of 
Russian diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Russian Federation 1995, 2008), but on 
the ground there has been no evidence of Russia 
pursuing a well thought-out and consistent policy 
towards its neighbours (Hrustalev 2007). The 
Russian approach towards its closest neighbours 
is often misinterpreted, and the lack of a long-term 
foreign policy line is not recognized by foreign 
experts who characterise Russian policy within 
the territory of the CIS as coercive, assertive and 
aimed at building up a zone of Russian influence 
by all political, diplomatic, economic and military 
means, looking as the commentators do more at 
rhetoric than actual policy (Emerson 2008: 4; 
Aghayev 2009: 6-7). 
Another common feature of Russia’s approach 
towards the four conflicts relates to the undeniable 
fact that it has tried to use its presence as political 
leverage. According to the Russian scholars 
Dmitri Trenin and Andrey Ryabov, the continued 
presence (after ending the violence) of Russian 
peacekeepers in separatist entities has been aimed 
at putting pressure upon Georgia and Moldova 
so that they would change their pro-Western 
policy and begin cooperating more with Russia. 
However, this policy has served only to further 
alienate both states, and what had been planned as 
a short-term tactic has become Russia’s strategy 
in maintaining the status quo (Trenin 2006: 
13; Ryabov 2006: 35-36). By employing such 
methods, Russia has therefore failed to enduce 
the cooperation of its neighbours. Maintaining the 
status quo of the conflicts is said to be the most 
frequent characteristic of Russia’s diplomacy in 
the region (Racz 2010: 3). However, this argument 
is disputable. As will be shown below, Russia has 
made attempts, whether constructive or destructive 
in terms of ensuring the territorial integrity of its 
neighbours, to change the status quo, especially in 
the 21st century. Nevertheless, these Russian efforts 
cannot be defined as steps towards the political 
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resolution of the conflicts. This is particularly 
evident in Transnistria and South Ossetia. As 
Dmitri Trenin points out, although there were 
real difficulties in bringing the conflicting parties 
to a compromise, and Russia itself was weak in 
the 1990s, the crucial factor was the fact that 
Russia did not invest much in conflict resolution. 
Indeed, Russia was in principle satisfied with the 
situation, which allowed it to enjoy the privileges 
of being the only peacekeeper despite its formal 
recognition of the territorial integrity of Georgia 
and Moldova (Trenin 2006: 13).
Finally, Russia has sent peacekeeping forces 
to three of the four conflicts (the exception is 
Nagorno-Karabakh). In each case, these troops 
were deployed under the CIS mandate, without the 
involvement of the United Nations (UN), and were 
either composed exclusively of Russian forces (in 
the case of Abkhazia), or a combination of Russian 
contingents and forces from the conflicting 
parties (in the case of Transnistria). Russia has 
also provided financial, technical and material 
assistance to the breakaway regions, and many of 
their citizens have been given Russian passports. 
Although no Russian President had ever visited the 
unrecognised entities until 2008, deputies of the 
Russian Parliament, regional leaders and members 
of the Presidential administration paid visits to the 
separatist territories on numerous occasions. 
Despite the above mentioned general features, 
Russia’s involvement in conflict management and 
its policies towards their settlement have varied 
considerably in each case.
Nagorno-Karabakh
The dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
over Nagorno-Karabakh is the longest running 
and most serious unresolved conflict in the South 
Caucasus, involving two sovereign states. The 
six-year civil war (1988-1994) caused at least 
20,000 deaths, and any new escalation would 
have very serious implications for wider European 
security. According to Nasimi Aghayev, “the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains the greatest 
impediment for the regional cooperation and 
integration in the South Caucasus, and the region’s 
effective integration into Euro-Atlantic structures” 
(Aghayev 2009: 10). 
Russia is just one of three co-chairs (together 
with France and the US) of the so-called OSCE 
Minsk Group mediating direct talks between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. As Sergey Lavrov, 
Russia’s Foreign Minister, said in Yerevan in April 
2007, “the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is unique in 
the sense that there is no such unity of mediators 
concerning other regional conflicts. We hope to 
reach a compromise on Nagorno-Karabakh very 
soon, and that this will suit the interests of Erevan, 
Baku and all living in Nagorno-Karabakh” 
(Lavrov 2007).
Officially, Russia supports the idea that the 
content of the final resolution should be a matter 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia believes 
that regional conflicts should be approached on 
the basis of collective actions of the international 
community proceeding from the premise that 
modern conflicts cannot be solved by the use 
of force and that their settlement should be 
sought through engagement in dialogue and the 
negotiation of all parties rather than through the 
isolation of one of them. However, in practice 
little has been done to foster negotiations. In an 
interview with an Azeri newspaper, Dmitri Trenin 
highlighted that Russian participation had merely 
been of a symbolic nature, without the investment 
of significant resources towards resolving the 
conflict (Trenin 2009). Despite this passive 
stance, on the ground Russia is not perceived by 
Azerbaijan as a neutral actor in the conflict. Due 
to Russia’s economic and military assistance to 
Armenia, the country is in fact viewed to be pro-
Armenian. Armenia and Russia are also members 
of the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO)6, in which Azerbaijan does not participate. 
At the same time, it is widely recognised in 
Azerbaijan that Russia should be a key player 
in the conflict’s resolution (Nuriyev 2007: 19). 
Potentially, Russia’s role can consist both in 
assistance towards finding an optimal solution 
to the conflict and the provision of peacekeeping 
forces to oversee the implementation of this 
6 The CSTO was formed with the aim of strengthening peace, 
international and regional security and stability. By joint 
efforts the members coordinate and deepen political-military 
cooperation. The members of the CSTO are Russia, Armenia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan.
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solution. The possible provision of a Russian 
peacekeeping contingent to Nagorno-Karabakh 
was raised twice during 2006 by the then Russian 
Minister of Defence, Sergey Ivanov, in Baku. 
However, this can be a matter for discussion only 
once the negotiation deadlock is broken. Taking 
into account the uncompromising positions of the 
conflicting parties and the absence of international 
peacekeeping experience in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
the prospect of such a deployment looks from the 
very beginning to be very unlikely. As the Russian 
expert Alexei Vlasov claims, “international 
peacekeeping forces in the zone of the conflict 
would change the situation in principle, and 
neither Erevan nor Baku are ready for it” (Trend 
News 2010). As far as Russia’s contribution to the 
political resolution of the conflict is concerned, 
its leverage seems to be limited as well. Besides 
fruitless discussions between the Armenian and 
Azeri leaders on a possible compromise, there 
are two other principal factors that limit Russia’s 
political influence. First, together with the efforts 
of international organisations, the US, France 
and Russia in mediating the conflict, the role and 
interests of important regional actors such as Iran 
and Turkey are recognised by Russian experts and 
policy-makers. In this diverse club of mediators, 
Russia alone cannot provide a breakthrough. 
Second, Russia’s influence over Armenia, its main 
strategic partner in the South Caucasus, is limited. 
To force Armenia into a compromise (something 
likely to involve the return of Armenian-held 
territories to Azerbaijan), Russia needs to be 
able to suggest something substantial. Drawing 
a parallel between the EU’s involvement in 
the dispute between Kosovo and Serbia, and 
Russia’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 
Dmitri Trenin believes that Russia does not have 
resources comparable to those of the EU (i.e. a 
potential membership perspective for both Serbia 
and Kosovo) to stimulate Baku and Erevan into 
action. Indeed, Russia has been unable to suggest 
anything other than the venues to hold mediation 
summits (Trenin 2009).  
One such meeting took place on 2 November, 
2008 in Moscow, when the Presidents of Russia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a Declaration 
on Nagorno-Karabakh. The initiative was taken 
by the Russian side, and should be considered 
in close connection with the Caucasus crisis of 
2008, which pushed Russia to play a more active 
role in managing other regional conflicts. It is 
important to note that Russian officials pointed 
out the difference between the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict and the conflicts in Georgia, and clearly 
emphasised the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. 
Although the Declaration was the first of its kind 
on such a level (Aghayev 2009: 8), it did not bring 
anything new towards resolving the long-running 
standoff. Both sides confirmed the mediating role 
of the OSCE Minsk Group and their intentions to 
search for political solutions to the conflict based 
on the principles of international law (Regnum 
2008). 
The Russian President has made other attempts 
to force the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia 
to sign a peace agreement, including during 
tripartite meetings in Sochi (January 2010) and 
Saint Petersburg (June 2010). Meanwhile, the 
activism of the Russian side has not brought any 
practical results. The most recent statement of the 
Presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group‘s Co-Chair 
countries was made at the G8 Summit in Toronto 
(June 2010). The elements of a future settlement 
were elaborated on the basis of the principles of 
the 2007 Madrid agreement and include: (1) the 
return of the occupied territories surrounding 
Nagorno-Karabakh; (2) an interim status for 
Nagorno-Karabakh guaranteeing security and 
self-governance; (3) a corridor linking Armenia to 
Nagorno-Karabakh; (4) final status of Nagorno-
Karabakh to be determined in the future by a 
legally-binding expression of will; (5) the right 
of all internally-displaced persons and refugees 
to return; (6) international security guarantees, 
including a peacekeeping operation (The White 
House 2010). Generally supported by the Azeri 
side, the statement has not received any clear 
response from Armenia. The most controversial 
point of the statement is that referring to the final 
status of Nagorno-Karabakh, since the document, 
whether deliberately or not, does not specify 
if only the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh 
or the whole of Azerbaijan will be polled. It is 
interesting to note that on the Kremlin’s official 
website, the Russian translation of this ambiguous 
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point does not correspond to the official English 
version and reads as follows: the final status of 
Nagorno-Karabakh is to be determined in the 
future by a legally-binding expression of will by 
its population.7
In conclusion, Russia’s involvement in the 
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute has been less visible in 
comparison with its involvement in other regional 
conflicts. However, this has not pushed other 
international actors, including the EU, to play a 
more active role in the settlement of the conflict 
(see below). Additionally, until the Caucasus 
crisis in 2008, the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute was 
considered the most difficult regional conflict to 
resolve. 
Transnistria
According to Andrey Zagorski, like Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, Moldova has not registered strongly 
on Russia’s radar (Zagorski 2005: 72). The current 
political format of managing the Transnistria 
conflict is known as ‘5+2’, and includes Moldova, 
Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE and 
two observers – the US and the EU. The aim of 
negotiations is to find an appropriate solution for 
the return of the breakaway region of Transnistria 
to Moldova. The negotiations were stopped in 
2006 but recommenced in 2008. Peacekeeping 
is carried out by an operational group of the 
Russian army (about 1300 military officials) as 
well as Moldovan and Transnistrian contingents. 
Subsequently, these have been joined by military 
observers from Ukraine. In addition to these 
forces, a Russian military base still remains on the 
territory of Transnistria. 
The most famous attempt by Moscow to settle 
the conflict was the ‘Kozak plan’ of 2003. At a 
meeting held in Kiev in July 2002, the conflicting 
sides agreed for the first time to build a federal 
state. Soon after, to the surprise of the Western 
partners, Moscow unexpectedly suggested its own 
settlement plan, which proposed the establishment 
of an asymmetric federation. Mediated by Dmitri 
Kozak, the proposal was to be signed on 26 
November, 2003. However, Vladimir Voronin, the 
7 See http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/623, last accessed 10 
December 2010.
President of Moldova, refused to sign it. Russian 
experts have suggested several explanations for 
what happened. Most conclude that Chisinau’s 
aspirations for European integration were the 
cause of the denouncement of the Moscow-
brokered settlement proposal (Tolkacheva 2006: 
54; Zagorski 2005: 72). Moldova was interested 
in widening the format of negotiations and at the 
same time looking for an alternative settlement 
plan. Some Russian experts (as well as some 
European ones) saw the direct involvement of the 
EU in Moldova’s denouncement of the Moscow-
brokered settlement (Trenin 2006: 14; Barbe/
Kienzle 2007: 532). Other experts cautiously 
pointed out that Russian activism in Moldova 
simply coincided with the efforts of the Dutch 
government (then holding the chairmanship of 
the OSCE) “to push for faster settlement of the 
conflict and to consider the idea of an eventual 
EU-led peacekeeping operation in the area” 
(Zagorski 2005: 72). 
It is important to stress that alternative 
settlement attempts have also failed. In particular, 
after the Orange Revolution, the new Ukrainian 
leadership offered another settlement plan, 
known as the ‘Yushchenko plan’. Envisaged 
to be implemented over a period of 18 months, 
the plan included seven points, aimed at the 
democratisation of the breakaway entity. In fact, 
only one point was realised when in July 2005 
Moldova adopted a law recognising the special 
status of Transnistria as a part of the unitary state of 
Moldova. The law received a negative response in 
Transnistria, and negotiations were blocked again. 
Since 2006, Moldova has pushed the ‘3D’ Strategy 
aimed at democratisation, decriminalisation, and 
demilitarisation of Transnistria, which is also 
supported by Western partners (Tolkacheva 2006: 
54-57). 
After the failure of the Kozak plan, Russia 
toughened its policy towards Moldova by putting 
a ban on the import of wine, fruit and vegetables 
from the Republic. All formal contacts between 
the two countries‘ Presidents were postponed. 
Relations were renewed only in August 2006, when 
Vladimir Voronin attended an informal summit 
of the CIS, where a meeting with Vladimir Putin 
was agreed upon. According to Anna Tolkacheva, 
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the President of Moldova might have changed 
his foreign policy line due to the pressure created 
by Moldova‘s serious economic dependence on 
Russia, and as a result of disillusionment with 
the lack of support from the EU and Ukraine 
(Tolkacheva 2006: 61). In October of the same 
year, there was a meeting between the Russian and 
Moldovan Foreign Ministers, and the Russian-
Moldovan intergovernmental Commission on 
trade and economic cooperation resumed its 
work. 
In principle, it is in Russia’s interests to have 
Moldova and Transnistria as a united state (Trenin 
2006: 17), but inconsistency between Russian 
policy and that of other interested actors (foremost 
the EU and Ukraine) has been the main obstacle 
to finding an appropriate solution for this conflict. 
Again, Russia intensified its mediation efforts after 
August 2008. Moscow hosted a trilateral Russia-
Moldova-Transnistria meeting on 18 March, 
2009. In the tripartite statement, signed by Dmitri 
Medvedev (Russia), Vladimir Voronin (Moldova) 
and Igor Smirnov (Transnistria), the importance 
of the ‘5+2’ negotiation format was underlined. 
The sides also recognised the role of the current 
peacekeeping operation in the region, but did not 
exclude its transformation into a peacekeeping 
operation under the auspices of the OSCE upon 
an eventual settlement of the Transnistria conflict 
(Medvedev/Voronin/Smirnov 2009). The political 
crisis in Moldova, which broke out after the April 
2009 elections, resulted in the formation of a 
new government in autumn 2009. It is yet to be 
seen what policy towards Transnistria the new 
Moldovan leadership will adopt in the longer term. 
However, it is significant that in one of his first 
official statements, Vladimir Filat, the new Prime 
Minister, called for the withdrawal of the Russian 
contingent from Transnistria in accordance with 
the decisions of the 1999 Istanbul summit of the 
OSCE, and their replacement by an international 
civil mission (RIA Novosti 2009). 
It seems that the search for a political solution 
to the Transnistria dispute, which would suit both 
conflicting parties, is often substituted by the 
quarrel over the right to have a mission on the 
ground. While appreciating Moldova’s annoyance 
at the continued Russian military base and 
peacekeepers on its soil, one should also recognise 
that Transnistria sees the Russian presence as a 
guarantee that its interests will eventually be taken 
into account. The widening of the negotiation 
format has not brought about any meaningful 
political settlement to the conflict, which remains 
locked in a stalemate. 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia
Russia’s involvement in conflict settlement on 
the territory of Georgia had always been the most 
controversial, even before the events of August 
2008. After breaking out in December 1990, the 
conflict in South Ossetia was ended in June 1992 by 
the signing of a ceasefire agreement in Dagomys. 
According to the agreement, Russia was to act as 
a guarantor of peace and security. In August 1992, 
there was a further escalation in another conflict 
on Georgian territory – in Abkhazia. According to 
experts, in the years prior to this (1991-1992) and 
during the first month of the war, Russia played a 
double role, providing military aid both to Georgia 
and Abkhazia. There was no consensus among 
the Russian policy-making elites with regard 
to the conflict. Only after September 1992 did 
Russia begin to support Abkhazia more actively 
(Antonenko 2005: 251-257). Shevarnadze had no 
other choice but to sign another ceasefire agreement 
with Russia, the so-called Moscow Agreement of 
1994 on Abkhazia. The Georgian leadership acted 
under the threat of a further escalation of the conflict 
and a possible large-scale confrontation with their 
much stronger neighbour. This explains why the 
Georgian President had to agree to negotiation 
formats and mechanisms of conflict settlement 
with Russia in the leading role, although Georgia 
would have preferred greater involvement of other 
international actors in conflict resolution efforts.
Although the peacekeeping forces stationed 
in Abkhazia had a mandate from the CIS, they 
were exclusively Russian troops. For political 
negotiations, two formats were established: 
the Geneva process (with the participation of 
Georgia and Abkhazia and the UN Secretary-
General’s Group of Friends of Georgia, involving 
representatives from Russia, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, France and the US) and the Sochi 
process, which was agreed to in 2003 with the 
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participation of Russia, Georgia and Abkhazia. 
In South Ossetia, the Joint Peacekeeping Force 
was formed, composed of battalions from Russia, 
Georgia and North Ossetia, whereby the latter 
has not participated in peacekeeping efforts since 
1994 (Golts 2006: 69-71). The Joint Control 
Commission (JCC) was established for negotiations 
on the settlement of the conflict. Together with 
representatives from Russia, Georgia and South 
Ossetia there were again participants from North 
Ossetia in the JCC and, as experts rightly point 
out, Georgia was not in an advantageous position, 
as Russia was in fact represented twice (Popescu 
2006b: 42, Nalbandov 2009: 27).
After the Rose Revolution in 2003, the new 
leadership under President Mikheil Saakashvili 
made the restoration of Georgia’s territorial 
integrity a priority. Despite the withdrawal of 
Russian troops from Adzharia (another region 
of Georgia demanding greater autonomy from 
the central authorities), relations between Russia 
and Georgia did not improve. Moscow’s tougher 
policy towards Tbilisi (a ban on imports of wine, 
mineral water and other goods) did not force 
Georgia into giving up its ambition to become a 
member of NATO. From Russia’s point of view, 
Georgia‘s aspiration for NATO membership has 
become the most contentious issue in Russia-
Georgia relations. 
Despite uneasiness in relations between 
Georgia and Russia, the latter did not question 
the territorial integrity of the former. Between 5 
and 6 December, 2005, there was another attempt 
to settle the conflict regarding South Ossetia at a 
meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 
OSCE member states, held in Ljubljana, Slovenia. 
The meeting resulted in a document that confirmed 
the territorial integrity of Georgia and approved a 
peace plan for Georgia composed of three points 
– demilitarisation, economic rehabilitation and 
political settlement. Russia signed the document 
along with the other participants, although the plan 
was finally set aside due to disagreements between 
Tbilisi and Tskhinvali (Sukhov 2006: 120). 
These ‘frozen’ conflicts began ‘unfreezing’ 
before the five-day war of August 2008. In this 
sense, the war was just the culmination of the 
changes that had taken place in previous years. 
Sergey Markedonov believes that both Moscow 
and Tbilisi had their own reasons for overturning 
the status quo established in the conflict zones 
at the beginning of the 1990s and for unfreezing 
the conflicts. While Georgia wanted to widen the 
negotiation format by including new participants 
such as the OSCE and the EU and by questioning 
the legal basis of the conflicts’ resolution, Russia 
supported the separatist provinces more actively.
Georgian impatience was identified by Bruno 
Coppieters as one of the factors, which could lead 
to the conflicts’ escalation (Coppieters 2007: 5). 
Indeed in summer 2004, Georgia tried to regain 
control of South Ossetia and the sides came close 
to a new war. In 2006, Georgia took over the 
upper Kodori Gorge by military means, and set 
up a so-called ‘parallel administration’ for Upper 
Abkhazia. This move clearly demonstrated that 
Georgia did not want to recognise the existing 
status quo of the conflict. According to Andrey 
Ryabov, these actions had negative repercussions 
for the negotiation process. Abkhazia no longer 
had any illusions that Tbilisi was ready to use 
military force to return the self-proclaimed entity 
to its control (Ryabov 2006: 33). Russia supported 
both breakaway entities financially and through 
a policy of conferring Russian citizenship to the 
populace of both republics. However, until 2008 
these measures were pursued only unofficially; 
the political leadership did not encourage an open 
political debate on their motives and reasonability. 
Only in March 2008 did Russia officially lift the 
trade, finance, and transport sanctions that had 
been imposed on Abkhazia in 1996, although 
informally Russia had not followed the sanction 
regime since 1999 (Antonenko 2005: 267). On 
21 March, 2008, members of the State Duma 
adopted a resolution (with the support of 441 
of 450 deputies) suggesting a discussion on 
whether it would be practical to recognise the 
independence of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and 
Transnistria. Although the measure was a non-
binding recommendation, it included a call by 
the deputies to recognise Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia’s independence (Markedonov 2008: 6). 
The issue of independence was not raised 
accidentally in spring 2008. Although rejecting it 
rhetorically, Russia followed the Western policy 
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on Kosovo. Russian experts had speculated on 
possible conditions that would make Russia 
give up its adherence to the principle of the 
inviolability of post-Soviet borders long before 
2008. In 2006, Andrey Ryabov suggested four 
hypothetical conditions that would push Russia to 
support Abkhazia’s independence (Ryabov 2006: 
37). Abkhazia was considered the most likely 
case for independence next to South Ossetia and 
Transnistria. The conditions were as follows: (1) 
the recognition of an independent Kosovo by the 
international community; (2) Georgia’s decision 
to leave the CIS; (3) the start of Georgia’s NATO 
membership bid; (4) the end of the mandate for 
Russian peacekeepers in the region. 
Meanwhile, the Parliament’s resolution seems 
to have been more a rhetorical act than a trumpet-
call. Despite the actual existence of two of the 
conditions by the summer of 2008 – Kosovar 
independence and talks about Georgian NATO 
membership –. Russia was in no rush to recognise 
the international sovereignty of the breakaway 
republics. This suggests that originally Russia was 
not in favour of radical scenarios, even in the case of 
Abkhazia. As far as South Ossetia was concerned, 
there was even more room for manoeuvre and, 
were it not for the August war, Russia may well 
have continued the policy of gradual efforts to 
strengthen South Ossetian de facto independence, 
while stopping short of legal recognition. The 
declaration of Kosovar independence certainly 
pushed Abkhazia and South Ossetia to expedite the 
process of their separation from Georgia, so they 
also worked towards ‘unfreezing the conflicts’. 
Instead of investigating who bears responsibility 
for triggering the war, the important question is 
whether it would have been possible to prevent the 
escalation. This question is answered differently by 
Russian and Western scholars. European experts 
see the EU influence in the South Caucasus as very 
limited, mainly due to Russia’s political leverage 
in the region. As Emma Stewart notes “while local 
actors are responsible for the conflict, preventive 
engagement by the EU may have helped to curb 
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s rash 
actions in South Ossetia” (E. Stewart 2008b: 2). 
However, according to Andrey Ryabov, if the US 
and the EU did in fact have a monopoly (economic, 
political and military) in managing the conflicts 
in the Balkans, there was a parity of influence of 
international actors in the South Caucasus. In the 
case of a new escalation, warned the scholar in 
2006, Moscow, Brussels and Washington would be 
unable to prevent the use of military force (Ryabov 
2006: 38). To better understand the potential of 
EU influence in the South Caucasus, it is worth 
analysing its policies towards the region more in 
detail.  
In conclusion, Russia‘s experience in managing 
conflicts within the territory of the CIS has been 
uneven. As Dmitri Trenin concludes, the ‘frozen 
conflicts’ can be neither a guarantee for Russia’s 
security nor an effective instrument for retaining 
neighbouring states in its sphere of influence (Trenin 
2008: 28). Russia’s moves to contribute to conflict 
resolution have been quite reluctant, and have not 
broken the negotiation deadlock in any of the four 
cases. Russia constantly felt both the pressure of 
Georgia and Moldova, which have questioned the 
legitimacy of Russian peacekeeping forces, and 
that caused by the interest of other international 
actors in launching civil and civil-military missions 
of their own. In sum, it has invested much (both 
rhetorically and in practice) in defending its right 
to remain in the zones of conflict. However, as 
Ivan Sukhov has rightly noted, the presence of a 
Russian contingent in Georgia should not have 
been a goal in itself. Unlike the situation in the 
1990s, a Russian peacekeeping mission would 
have made sense only if it was combined with 
active Russian efforts towards conflict settlement, 
together with the US and the EU (Sukhov 2006: 
117). This chapter has shown that Russia has 
not demonstrated much interest in finding a 
political solution for the conflicts. Its steps were 
more tactical, aimed at avoiding a re-escalation 
of the conflicts. The question is to what extent 
this Russian reluctance has pushed other actors 
(notably the EU) to suggest their own scenarios 
for the political settlement of the conflicts. This 
will be the focus of the next chapter. 
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II EU involvement in conflict ma-
nagement in its Eastern neighbour-
hood
Instruments for conflict management 
Until 2008 the EU’s involvement in the management 
of regional conflicts beyond its Eastern borders 
had been characterised as “cautious” (Coppieters 
2007: 17), “low profile” (Kienzle 2008: 15) 
“visibly invisible” (German 2007: 357), and 
“reluctant” (Popescu 2009: 457). But, if in the 
1990s the EU played hardly any role in conflict 
management in the CIS, this situation gradually 
changed after 2003. Nicu Popescu provides the 
best account of why the EU has reinforced its 
engagement in the South Caucasus, explaining it 
as a mixture of broader trends in the development 
of the EU and the region. The EU enlargement of 
2004, progress in institutionalising the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 
and by extension, the adoption of the ESS and the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Rose 
Revolution in Georgia and the new leadership’s 
ambition to reunify the country, all represent 
changes that contributed to the EU’s increasing 
role in the region (Popescu 2007: 4-5). In 2002-
2003 the EU also joined the process of conflict 
resolution in Moldova/Transnistria contributing 
to discussions on the text of a Constitution for a 
potential unified state of Moldova. 
It is difficult to make a clear distinction between 
the EU’s instruments with regard to conflict 
management, which are taken by the European 
Community or under the CFSP/ESDP. As some 
experts have written “the implementation of 
conflict prevention activities has so far highlighted 
a strong complementarity between EU instruments 
and the CFSP/ESDP. In several cases, the RRM 
[Rapid Reaction Mechanism] managed by the 
Commission was used as a first step for feasibility 
studies or needs assessment assignments before 
launching a mission under the CFSP/ESDP” 
(Delcour/Tulmets 2009: 518). As far as the 
European Commission is concerned, it has issued 
a number of documents highlighting the danger 
of the so-called ‘frozen conflicts’ on the borders 
of the EU. In particular, the 2001 Communication 
from the Commission on Conflict Prevention 
defined “projecting stability” as the EU’s long-
term conflict prevention policy (European 
Commission 2001: 6). The Commission has also 
provided financial assistance for Moldova and for 
the rehabilitation of the conflict zones in Georgia.
When it comes to the second pillar, for the 
conflict management in the Eastern neighbourhood, 
the EU has used a wide range of tools: (1) 
Statements of the EU High Representative (HR); 
(2) Common Positions; (3) Conclusions of the 
Council; (4) Presidency Declarations; (5) the 
appointment of EU Special Representatives; (6) 
the launch of ESDP missions (see below). One 
should also mention the ESS of 2003, emphasising 
conflicts as the key threats to European security. 
The document also calls for “a stronger and more 
active interest in the problems of the Southern 
Caucasus” (European Council 2003: 8). However, 
there is a lack of clarity as to how exactly and by 
what instruments the Union intends to contribute 
to the resolution of these conflicts. The Strategy 
simply states that “preventive engagement can 
avoid more serious problems in the future” 
(European Council 2003: 11). 
The ENP, conceived as a cross-pillar policy, 
also has provisions concerning regional conflicts. 
The very idea of the ENP is “to avoid drawing new 
dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability 
and prosperity within and beyond the new borders 
of the Union” (European Commission 2003: 4). In 
a Strategy Paper of May 2004, the Commission 
specified that the ENP should reinforce the EU’s 
contribution to promoting the settlement of regional 
conflicts (European Commission 2004b: 6). 
However, it is interesting to note that the language 
of the document is again very cautious with regard 
to instruments of conflict resolution. In mentioning 
the possible involvement of partner countries in 
aspects of CFSP and ESDP, conflict prevention, 
crisis management and possible participation 
in EU-led crisis management operations, the 
document does not specify the regions in which 
joint action may be possible. One may assume that 
such involvement does not necessarily cover the 
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territory of neighbouring states, since “the further 
development of a shared responsibility between 
the EU and partners for security and stability in 
the neighbourhood region” is named as “another 
important priority”, without specifying by what 
means (European Commission 2004b: 13). The 
ENP envisages the use of instruments such as an 
Action Plan, worked out for each country. In the 
respective Action Plans for Georgia, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Moldova, making a contribution 
to the peaceful solution of conflicts is named as 
one of the priorities (European Commission 2005, 
2006b, 2006c, 2006d). Meanwhile, the documents 
envisage finding a “peaceful solution to conflicts” 
only with the central authorities. In practice 
therefore, the ENP and the respective Action 
Plans do not seek to involve breakaway entities in 
cooperative measures.
It should be noted that the ENP is often 
criticised for achieving little, even in improving 
trade and economic relations (traditionally the most 
elaborated and advanced spheres of cooperation 
between the EU and the countries without prospects 
of membership). As far as political cooperation is 
concerned, the ENP is not particularly inspiring 
(Smith and Webber 2008: 94). Since the ENP was 
not a specific tool for conflict management per 
se, the outputs with regard to conflict resolution 
have been very modest. This was recognised by 
the European Commission at the end of 2006 
(European Commission 2006a: 4).
In May 2009, the EU launched the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP), a continuation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy aimed at deepening relations 
between the EU and its six Eastern neighbouring 
states. It is too early to assess if this format will be 
more successful in building partnerships between 
the EU and its Eastern neighbours. However, it 
seems that the EaP scheme is even vaguer with 
regard to regional conflicts. In its Communication 
of December 2008, the European Commission 
stressed that one of the goals of the EaP should be 
the consolidation of the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of partners and that one of the results of 
the policy should be increased internal stability. 
Regional conflicts as such and the goal of their 
resolution have disappeared from the document. 
The document simply mentions that early-warning 
arrangements should be enhanced, with particular 
focus on conflict areas (European Commission 
2008a: 11). The Joint Declaration of the Prague 
Eastern Partnership Summit of May 2009 is 
very brief on the issue, saying only that conflicts 
(without any specification) impede cooperation 
activities and a peaceful settlement needs to be 
found at the earliest possible date on the basis 
of the principles and norms of international law 
(Council of the European Union 2009a: 6). 
Council Conclusions on the South Caucasus have 
not made any reference to the issue of conflict 
resolution either (Council of the European Union 
2009b).
In light of recent institutional changes in the 
EU, brought about by the ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty, it remains to be seen what implications 
this will have for the EU’s conflict resolution 
policy. In an interview to the Azeri news agency 
in November 2009, Antonio Missiroli claimed 
that “solving conflicts in neighbouring EU 
countries is a major issue for the cabinet of the 
first EU Foreign Minister. However, whether it 
is a priority for the EU will become clear only in 
several months” (Trend News 2009). Indeed, the 
High Representative Catherine Ashton has made 
a number of statements concerning the unresolved 
conflicts during her first months in office (see 
below). 
Thus, in the last few years, the EU has claimed 
the need for conflict resolution in its Eastern 
neighbourhood on a number of occasions. The 
question is, how has the EU contributed to conflict 
management on the ground. As will be shown, the 
EU has, similar to Russia, demonstrated differing 
degrees of involvement in the four conflicts.
Nagorno-Karabakh 
The EU has not formally received the status 
of official mediator in managing this conflict. 
The OSCE Minsk Group and its three co-chairs 
(France, Russia and the US) have mediated peace 
talks. According to experts, the process is highly 
confidential and the EU has no direct access to the 
process, having instead to rely on the French co-
chair to remain informed (Akcakoca et al. 2009: 
15). Moreover, France is often viewed by experts 
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as opposing the EU’s greater involvement.8  
The appointment of an EU Special 
Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus 
was aimed at demonstrating the deeper 
involvement of the Union in conflict management. 
In 2003, Heikki Talvitie was appointed as the first 
EUSR for the South Caucasus and was replaced in 
2006 by Peter Semneby. According to the revised 
EUSR mandate, the Special Representative must 
contribute to the settlement of conflicts and 
facilitate the implementation with the UN and 
OSCE (Council of the European Union 2007b: 76). 
For the conflict settlement on Nagorno-Karabakh 
the EUSR works closely with the co-chairs of the 
OSCE Minsk Group.
The ENP Action Plans designed for Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, have reflected the EU‘s ambivalent 
position on the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh 
and experts have noted interesting variations in 
both documents (German 2007: 362; Alieva 2006: 
12-13). The respective Action Plans accommodate 
two contradictory principles: ‘territorial integrity’ 
in the case of Azerbaijan, and the ‘right of nations 
for self-determination’ in the case of Armenia. 
This has produced mistrust among the conflicting 
parties in the EU’s ability to contribute to the 
conflict resolution process. On the one hand, a 
“‘peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict’ represents the first priority area in 
Azerbaijan’s Action Plan, but only the seventh 
in Armenia’s” (German 2007: 362). On the other 
hand, the EU’s original refusal to stress ‘territorial 
integrity’ in Azerbaijan’s case (although this 
principle was included in the Action Plans for both 
Georgia and Moldova) “was perceived as a double 
standards approach both by the government and 
society of Azerbaijan” (Alieva 2006: 12-13). 
In general, the EU has adopted an approach 
very similar to the Russian one; namely that an 
agreement on the conflict’s resolution must be 
reached between Armenia and Azerbaijan. As 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the former Commissioner 
for External Relations, claimed, there is only 
one acceptable decision which must be agreed 
upon by the two sides. As far as the EU’s role is 
8 European Policy Center, interview by author, 9 March 2010, 
Brussels, Belgium.
concerned, it is too early to say if the EU can play 
a more active role in the resolution of the regional 
conflicts (Ferrero-Waldner 2009). Despite some 
speculation concerning the possible deployment of 
EU peacekeeping forces into the conflict zone, the 
Press Secretary of the then EU High Representative 
Javier Solana also stated in November 2009 that it 
was still too premature to discuss such an action. 
“If such step is needed and useful, the EU will 
be ready to make its contribution to this issue” 
(APA 2008). High Representative Catherine 
Ashton appears to be giving special attention to 
this conflict, having made two statements recently 
(Ashton 2010a, 2010b). However, these simply 
reiterate the EU’s full support to the efforts of the 
OSCE Minsk Group and the work of the three 
co-chairs. Ashton cautiously recalled the EU’s 
readiness to offer further support in order to find 
a negotiated solution to the conflict. However, the 
form of support and the concrete steps that this 
would take were not specified. As Nicu Popescu 
rightly asserts in assessing the EU’s approach 
to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: “the EU was 
waiting for peace to act rather than act to promote 
peace” (Popescu 2009: 473).
Transnistria 
Since October 2005, the EU has been involved in 
the ‘5+2’ format (Moldova, Transnistria, OSCE, 
Russia, Ukraine, with the US and the EU as 
observers), a new negotiation format aimed at the 
settlement of the Transnistria conflict. In March 
2005, the EU also appointed Adriaan Jacobovits as 
the EUSR for Moldova. In 2007, Kalman Mizsei 
replaced him with a mandate to strengthen the EU’s 
contribution to the resolution of the Transnistria 
conflict and to assist in the preparation of an EU 
contribution to the implementation of an eventual 
conflict settlement (Council of the European Union 
2007a: 60). 
EU actors consider the Transnistria dispute the 
least complicated of the four conflicts (considered 
in this paper) in terms of reaching a settlement.9 
Despite this fact and repeated calls from Moldova 
for a greater EU role in resolving the conflict, the 
9 European Commission, interview by author, 8 March 2010, 
Brussels, Belgium.
SPES Policy Papers 2011
21
EU has not elaborated any consistent strategy for 
achieving a political settlement. Most measures 
taken by the EU have been aimed first and foremost 
at strengthening the Moldovan economy. Moldova 
has received substantial financial assistance from 
the EU with a view to making the idea of a united 
country more attractive for the breakaway entity.  
The establishment of the EU Border Assistance 
Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) was 
another step aimed at undermining the economic 
independence of Transnistria. Deployed in 
December 2005, the mission formally has the 
following goals: to assist Moldova and Ukraine 
in harmonising their border management practices 
with those of EU countries, to enhance the 
professional capacities of customs officials and 
border guards, and to improve cooperation between 
border guards and customs services.10 Meanwhile, 
its special focus was on the Transnistrian-
controlled section of the border. In order “to 
reduce the benefits of the secessionist status quo”, 
the mission aimed at reducing smuggling and 
trafficking activities around Transnistria (Popescu 
2009: 462). Experts see the first results of EUBAM 
differently. According to some scholars, the 
mission reduced smuggling opportunities (Barbe/
Kienzle 2007: 528; Popescu 2009: 462). However, 
according to Xymena Kurowska and Benjamin 
Tallis, “there has been little demonstrable progress 
[in terms of] the mission’s possible contribution 
to the betterment of the Transnistrian situation” 
(Kurowska/Tallis 2009: 63). It is also worth 
mentioning that the leadership of the breakaway 
entity perceived actions aimed at the integration 
of Ukrainian and Moldovan customs services 
as an ‘economic blockade’ of Transnistria. Igor 
Smirnov, the Head of the unrecognised Republic, 
called for a withdrawal from political negotiations 
on the settlement of the conflict (Tolkacheva 2006: 
57). Since 2006, Transnistrian companies wanting 
access to the Ukrainian and EU markets have been 
obliged to register with the official Government in 
Chisinau and to ensure that export goods bear the 
customs stamps of Moldova. Again, this measure 
had the goal of reintegrating the Transnistrian 
10 For more detail, see www.eubam.org, last accessed 10 December 
2010.
businesses into the Moldovan economy. Yet it 
is questionable if this registration has made the 
Transnistrian business community more loyal to 
the Moldovan government, and more importantly, 
whether it has made them ready to question 
the legitimacy of Smirnov’s regime. Unlike in 
Moldova, there has been no change in the ruling 
elite in Transnistria over the last 19 years. 
The restrictive measures taken by the EU 
against the leadership of the Transnistrian region 
demonstrate another of the EU’s instruments. 
The last time the Council adopted a decision on 
the visa ban applying to a number of persons in 
Transnistria was in February 2010 (Council of 
the European Union 2010: 1-2). Meanwhile, 
this decision provided for the suspension of the 
visa ban until 30 September, 2010, in order to 
encourage progress towards a political settlement 
of the Transnistrian conflict. As in the case of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, HR Catherine Ashton, has 
recently turned her attention to Transnistria. In 
her statement on 17 May, 2010, she confirmed 
the EU’s commitment to the resumption of 
negotiations in the ‘5+2’ format, and invited all 
sides to support the efforts of the Republic of 
Moldova in implementing confidence building 
measures (Ashton 2010c). 
One of the most debatable questions with regard 
to the EU’s policy towards Moldova deals with the 
issue of providing EU peacekeeping forces for the 
contested region. Nicu Popescu believes that the 
EU’s failure to get involved with peacekeeping 
in Moldova is indicative of its hesitant role in the 
region (Popescu 2009: 463). This paper takes the 
view that the issue of peacekeeping should not 
be prioritised. More significant is the fact that the 
EU’s involvement in the ‘5+2’ conflict settlement 
format has not brought any meaningful results. 
Working around the Transnistrian conflict, the EU 
has not suggested any plan for political settlement 
comparable with those suggested by Russia in 
2003 and Ukraine in 2005. 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia
Even before the Caucasus crisis of August 2008, 
the EU had been involved in the international 
management of the secessionist conflicts in 
Georgia, but again mainly in the economic domain. 
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As far as the EU’s political role was concerned, 
the Union had received observer status in the JCC 
on South Ossetia, which aimed “to foster political 
reconciliation between the various sides” (German 
2007: 364). Individual member states (Germany, 
France and Britain) were also members of the UN 
Secretary-General’s Group of Friends of Georgia, 
established to mediate in the Abkhazia dispute. 
Nicu Popescu claims “the EU policies on the 
secessionist conflicts have been pursued at two 
levels. At a first level, the EU supports Georgia’s 
transformation and reforms, which could make 
Georgia more attractive to Abkhazians and 
South Ossetians. The second level of EU policies 
specifically targets the secessionist entities. The EU 
has financed the rehabilitation of the conflict zones 
and from 2006 became the biggest international 
donor to South Ossetia and Abkhazia” (Popescu 
2007: 13-15). Meanwhile, there have been certain 
limitations to the EU’s programmes. The goal of 
making Georgia economically attractive does 
not necessary mean that it will potentially lead to 
rapprochement between the conflicting parties. As 
far as the second level is concerned, the EU had 
to reach consensus on its activities (e.g. the ENP 
instruments) in the breakaway entities with the 
Georgian government. This, as Bruno Coppieters 
notes, created an imbalance between Georgia and 
its breakaway entities. Instead of building trust 
between the conflicting parties, the EU could 
potentially become part of a confrontational policy 
(Coppieters 2007: 19). 
In July 2004, the EU also launched a mission in 
Georgia under the ESDP. The Rule of Law mission 
EUJUST Themis was aimed at “assisting the new 
government in its efforts to bring local standards 
with regard to rule of law closer to international 
and EU standards”, as well as to assist with 
the reform of the criminal justice system. The 
mission ended in July 2005.11 Although it is 
often considered to be an instrument of conflict 
management, many scholars recognise that it was 
at the same time “relatively un-ambitious in scale” 
(Smith and Webber 2008: 92), and “distantly 
related to EU involvement in conflict resolution” 
11 For more detail, see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.
aspx?id=701&lang=En, last accessed 10 December 2010. 
(Popescu 2007: 12). 
In sum, the EU increased its involvement in 
Georgia during the period 2003-2008. However, its 
efforts have often been criticised as ‘insufficient’, 
both by the Georgian authorities and the expert 
community. The case of Georgia is probably the 
most representative in terms of the constraints that 
the EU has experienced for its eastward policies. 
Constraints on EU policies in the Eastern 
neighbourhood 
EU policies towards unresolved conflicts within 
the territory of the CIS are constrained by two sets 
of challenges: internal and external.
Internal challenges
Coherence is the most disputed topic in academic 
analysis of EU foreign policies. Michael Smith 
distinguishes between horizontal coherence 
(related to the harmonious application of EU 
foreign policy mechanisms and goals between 
different EU institutions) and vertical coherence 
(referring to the degree to which the policies of 
member states support common EU positions 
(Smith 2004: 27). Cross-pillar competition was 
evident in the launching of the EUBAM, when 
both the Council and the Commission competed 
for the institutional ownership of the mission: 
“Importantly, the institutional haggling over 
EUBAM illustrates how the realm of civilian 
crisis management offers political opportunities 
potentially accessible to both the Council and the 
Commission with consequent struggles to define 
given political situations according to the relative 
applicability of the tools at the disposal of each 
actor” (Kurowska/Tallis 2009: 50). The lack of 
horizontal coherence was revealed, for instance, 
in the case of disagreements between the member 
states on the issue of taking over the OSCE 
Border Monitoring Mission in Georgia, which 
was terminated by the Russian veto. According to 
a study conducted by Nicu Popescu, “inside the 
EU, the Baltic states, supported by the UK, were 
in favour of a border mission to Georgia, while 
France – with the support of Belgium, Italy, Spain, 
and Greece – and partly Germany opposed such a 
move” (Popescu 2007: 11).
Besides the above-mentioned dichotomies, 
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some experts note that certain EU policies (e.g. 
ENP and ESDP) have the potential to contradict 
one another. The launch of a military operation 
under the ESDP (‘interventionist’ option) “would 
mean the failure of the neighbourhood policy, 
which builds upon the traditional instruments 
of financial support, free trade and dialogue” 
(Diedrichs, et al. 2005: 10). 
The previously mentioned challenge is not 
of a merely hypothetical nature. It can be argued 
that the EU has been torn between relatively rapid 
progress in the ESDP, which allowed the launching 
of several missions within a short period of time, 
and the constraints of using the same instruments 
in certain regions, including in its Eastern 
neighbourhood. Another crucial issue is raised by 
Emma Stewart, who concludes that “[the EU’s] 
conflict prevention is becoming more and more 
associated with short-term crisis management, at 
the expense of long-term structural solutions to 
security problems” (E. Stewart 2008a: 253).   
Finally, one of the most provocative questions 
relates to the overall motivation of the EU’s 
external policy. Is it driven by an altruistic 
wish to help neighbouring states in adopting 
democratic values, establishing the rule of law, 
and enjoying security, peace and stability, or 
rather by a selfish interest in curbing immigration 
and trafficking? The EU’s self-perception as a 
normative power does not always correspond to 
external perceptions. Moreover, some official EU 
documents give quite material explanations when 
advocating the need for greater involvement in the 
discussed region. Thus, for example, the European 
Commission Communication on the ENP in 
December 2006 called on the EU to engage more 
actively in resolving frozen conflicts in the South 
Caucasus, as these may produce “major spillovers 
for the EU, such as illegal immigration, unreliable 
energy supplies, environmental degradation and 
terrorism” (European Commission 2006a: 2). The 
lack of clarity over EU intentions and final goals 
in the region, as well as in the instruments at its 
disposal, has been reinforced by some external 
challenges. 
External challenges
The core external challenge must be identified 
with specific reference to the characteristics of 
the region under analysis. However, to take into 
account all the peculiarities of the unresolved 
conflicts in the post-Soviet space, a separate study 
would be required (e.g. Bolshakov 2009). For this 
paper it is important to note that the EU’s diplomacy 
has been met by a lack of trust on the part of local 
actors. Additionally, if the elites of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia have suspected the EU of favouring 
Georgia (Fischer 2008: 5), Georgia itself has seen 
the EU as valuing relations with Russia instead 
of opposing Russia’s aggressive policy towards it 
(Popescu 2007: 11). 
Another external challenge for the EU’s 
engagement in conflict management within the 
territory of the CIS countries deals with the 
interests and involvement of other actors. Even 
if the activities of such players as the OSCE 
and the UN, aimed at supervising the process 
of international conflict management, have not 
been challenging for the EU, the same cannot be 
said of the role played by the US (and, by extent, 
NATO) and Russia. Again, the role of the US in 
the region and the issue of NATO’s programmes 
and eventual membership for the countries 
under analysis deserve a special study. Even 
before the Caucasus crisis of 2008, some experts 
warned that “Georgia’s integration into NATO 
– in particular, its prospective membership – is 
inevitably having a negative impact on conflict 
transformation and conflict settlement, and the 
lack of clarity surrounding these issues can only 
be perceived by the breakaway polities and Russia 
as being even more threatening” (Coppieters 
2007: 14-15). Recent studies reveal that “too little 
coordination has taken place between the EU and 
other important external actors, notably the US” 
(Fischer 2008: 5).
The role of ‘the Russian factor’ in EU 
calculations is important for this analysis. It has 
become notorious to stress that the EU (forced by 
particular member states) has been hesitant to clash 
with Russia in its traditional ‘zone of influence’ 
(Kienzle 2008: 15; Popescu 2009: 474; Aghayev 
2009: 6). Scholars suggest various reasons as to 
why the EU was not interested in jeopardising 
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its relationship with Moscow: dependence on 
Russia’s energy supplies, the importance of 
Russian cooperation on the Iran issue and a 
general need for engaging constructively with 
Russia, articulated by such large member states as 
France, Germany and Italy. Meanwhile, Russia’s 
growing proactive and self-confident policies 
in the region have played a decisive role in the 
EU’s calculations (Barbe/Kienzle 2007: 534). 
Russia’s involvement has been perceived by 
the EU as an obstacle for its own engagement. 
However, it may be argued that the EU was 
more informed, not by Russia’s real policy in the 
common neighbourhood, but by one constructed 
in accordance with European perceptions of 
Russia’s rhetoric. Real Russian involvement (and 
its capacity to react to the interference of other 
actors) has been very questionable, and to some 
extent, exaggerated. As mentioned above, until 
recently Russia has lacked a consistent and well 
thought-out policy towards the post-Soviet space, 
including the unresolved regional conflicts. If 
there had been a serious assessment of Russia’s 
foreign policy towards its ‘near abroad’, these 
shortcomings would have become evident. 
However, the EU policy-makers and expert 
community (following the logic of the EU’s 
own development in the ESDP domain) focused 
too much on criticising Russian peacekeeping 
forces, and speculated on the possibility (or, 
more precisely, on the impossibility due to fierce 
Russian opposition12) of their replacement with 
an international contingent, presumably under 
the EU flag. Therefore, the EU missed the chance 
to become more deeply involved in the political 
dialogue on the protracted conflicts. It would 
make sense to discuss instruments for the post-
settlement period once an appropriate political 
solution was found. 
It may be concluded that by summer 2008 
the EU had played a certain role in conflict 
management in the post-Soviet space, but many 
have argued that the EU needed to become still 
more involved (German 2007: 359). It seems 
12 For more details, see Bretherton, Charlotte/ John Vogler (2006): 
The European Union as a Global Actor. 2nd edition. London: 
Routledge: 210.
that the EU did not have enough time to adopt its 
policy to the rapid changes in the South Caucasus. 
As Bruno Coppieters wrote in December 2007, 
“the EU works on the basis of a long-term conflict 
resolution perspective […] Differences in timing 
create mutual fears. The EU fears that Georgian 
impatience may be one of the factors leading to 
the escalation of the conflicts to a violent level” 
(Coppieters 2007: 1). As mentioned above, it 
was not only Georgia that worked on changing 
the status quo. Paradoxically, in 2008, the EU 
must have been more interested (in comparison 
to Russia) in maintaining the status quo in the 
South Caucasus in order to win time to find a new 
approach for the conflict’s management.  
The outbreak of war in Georgia had many 
repercussions, which were not limited to the 
geo-strategic situation in the region. The EU’s 
conflict prevention policy had obviously failed. 
The burden of responsibility rests by no means 
solely on the EU, however. Russia and the US 
were much more to blame as external actors in the 
situation. However, while South Ossetia had been 
given priority over Abkhazia in the EU’s policies, 
it was there that the conflict boiled over. As EU 
diplomacy after the five day war of August 2008 
occurred in close cooperation with Russia, this 
will be considered in the next chapter.
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III The issue of conflict manage-
ment in EU-Russia relations
EU-Russia dialogue on conflict management 
(1999-2008)
Dialogue on conflict management is a part of 
the broader EU-Russia security cooperation. The 
importance of coordination between the EU and 
Russia on various security questions, including 
regional conflicts, is recognised in a number of 
key documents developed by both partners. The 
Common Strategy of the European Union on 
Russia (CSR), approved at the Cologne European 
Council in June 1999, states that EU-Russia 
cooperation promotes not only regional, but also 
global security. The Common Strategy does not 
exclude the possibility of developing “joint foreign 
policy initiatives” nor of Russian participation 
in Western European Union (WEU) missions, 
just as the necessity for closer cooperation in 
the “new European security architecture within 
the framework of the OSCE” is also emphasised 
(European Commission 1999). 
The Russian government responded with a 
similar document half a year later. The “Medium-
Term Strategy for the Development of Relations 
between the Russian Federation and the European 
Union (2000–2010)” can be viewed as the start 
of Putin’s European policy (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Russian Federation 1999). According 
to the document, Moscow is interested in helping 
shape the CFSP of the EU. Such cooperation will 
help to build European security without isolating 
the US and NATO, but, at the same time, also 
without their monopoly on the continent. Thus, 
the need to create a counter-balance to ‘the NATO-
centrism in Europe’ will help to establish a pan-
European security system, in which non-NATO 
member states are allowed to play a larger role. 
According to this strategy, Russia should promote 
aspects of cooperation such as peacekeeping and 
conflict settlement (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the Russian Federation 1999).  
An analysis of key Russian documents on 
foreign policy and national security has confirmed 
that, at the beginning of the 21st century, Russia 
did in fact, consider modalities of joint conflict 
management. The National Security Concept of 
the Russian Federation (January 2000) envisaged 
possible Russian cooperation on the prevention and 
settlement of regional conflicts with international 
partners including the EU (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Russian Federation 2000). However, 
recently approved documents – the Foreign Policy 
Concept of the Russian Federation (July 2008) and 
the National Security Strategy until 2020 (May 
2009) – do not include similar references (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the Russian Federation 2008, 
2009). This may be explained by Russia’s general 
disillusionment with the practical outcomes of 
cooperation with the West (such as the suspension 
of work on a new Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement and difficulties on the way towards a 
visa free regime between the EU and Russia). 
The prospects for EU-Russia security 
interaction, including on matters of conflict 
management, have been regularly addressed at 
European Councils. The European Councils in 
Helsinki (December 1999) and Feira (June 2000) 
concluded that Russia “may be invited to take part 
in EU-led operations” (European Council 1999, 
2000). At the Nice European Council in December 
2000, Russia was offered (along with Ukraine and 
Canada) a framework for consultation with the 
EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) on 
matters relating to the ESDP and military crisis 
management during the ‘routine phase’. During a 
‘crisis situation’, this framework (or, alternatively, 
direct consultations with the Secretary-General/
High Representative) would permit the sharing 
of views and the consideration of possible 
participation by Russia in a crisis-management 
operation. Should such participation become a 
reality, Russia would have the right to appoint 
officers to the EU Planning Staff and to attend the 
Committee of Contributors “with the same rights 
and obligations as the other participating states” 
(Webber 2001: 416-417). 
Since 1999, EU-Russia summits have also 
addressed issues related to international crisis 
management. The EU-Russia Summit in Moscow 
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(May 2000) confirmed an EU invitation made to 
Russia to participate in future crisis management 
operations, and the summits in Paris (October 
2000), Moscow (May 2002) and Rome (November 
2003) issued joint declarations on strengthening 
dialogue and cooperation on political and security 
matters in Europe, including work towards a 
joint approach in the field of crisis management 
(Council of the European Union 2000, 2002: 5-6). 
However, omitting the repeated broad statements, 
Russian practical involvement has been cautiously 
marked by the word ‘possible’. In particular, the 
EU acknowledged “possible Russian participation 
in the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” (Council of the European Union 
2002: 6). In January 2003, this participation did in 
fact become reality, but it was limited to just three 
Russian officers. 
Since the St. Petersburg EU-Russia Summit 
(May 2003), EU-Russian relations have been 
driven by the long-term project of creating four 
common spaces: a common economic space, a 
common space of freedom, security and justice, 
a space of co-operation in the field of external 
security, as well as a space for research and 
education (Council of the European Union 2003: 
1). The Moscow EU-Russia summit (May 2005) 
adopted a single package of road maps for the 
creation of the four common spaces (Council of 
the European Union 2005). ‘The Common Space 
of External Security’ became a good example of 
the two parties reaching a rhetorical compromise at 
the expense of eventual concrete fulfilment. While 
initially Russia did not want to commit to having to 
cooperate and consult on its neighbourhood policy, 
the EU rejected the idea of the mutual recognition 
of the processes of regional cooperation. From the 
perspective of the EU, it would have looked as if 
it had supported Russian influence and attempts 
at re-integration in the post-Soviet space, even 
if it meant that Russia exercised coercive policy 
towards its neighbours. A compromise was found 
and Russia agreed on enhancing “dialogue and 
cooperation on security and crisis management in 
order to address [...] existing and potential regional 
and local conflicts, and give particular attention to 
securing international stability, including in the 
regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders”. 
In turn, the EU agreed “to recognise that processes 
of regional cooperation and integration in which 
Russia and the EU participate and which are 
based on the sovereign decisions of States, play 
an important role in strengthening security and 
stability” (Council of the European Union 2005: 
32).
The security dialogue between the EU and 
Russia, including on the unresolved conflicts, is 
assessed differently by EU officials and scholars. 
While the former argue that the protracted 
conflicts are a centrepiece of EU-Russia political 
dialogue and that they are always on the agenda 
at the highest political level as well as in informal 
consultations13, the latter often criticise the EU 
for the absence of discussions with Russia on 
the regional conflicts.14 This ambiguity may be 
explained by the fact that, first, the process is 
highly confidential, and second, the intensity 
of talks does not necessary bring results that are 
reported to the public. Many studies describe 
the EU-Russia security interaction as “over-
institutionalised”, “heavy on process and light 
on substance”, an “illusion of activity” (Allison 
et al. 2006: 78) and “largely declaratory” (Lynch 
2005: 123). It is also important to add that the 
EU’s ability to act in the foreign policy domain 
has often been perceived sceptically by both the 
Russian policy making elite and expert community 
(Karaganov 2007). 
EU-Russia security interaction has been 
mainly dominated by (sometimes avoidable) 
disagreements on technical issues which blocked 
the path for discussing fundamental strategic 
questions. In particular, protracted debates about 
Russia’s possible contribution to the ESDP and its 
reluctance to accept that it could not have an equal 
place in EU decision-making processes related to 
the planning and implementation of operations15 
show the importance of technicalities in the EU-
Russia dialogue. Russia finally rejected the 2002 
13 European Commission and Secretariat of the EU Council, 
interview by author, 8-9 March 2010, Brussels, Belgium.
14 European Policy Centre, interview by author, 8 March 2010, 
Brussels, Belgium.
15 European Commission, interviews by author, June 2005, Brussels, 
Belgium.
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‘Seville arrangements’, which would have enabled 
its participation in ESDP missions (albeit not on 
an equal footing with the EU member states). 
Moreover, the issue of joint peace support units 
and military or civil-military operations should 
have been considered by the EU and Russia as 
complementary to their political dialogue on 
conflict settlement. Finally, as it is known, the EU 
dialogue on the ESDP was difficult even with non-
EU NATO members (namely, the US and Turkey). 
As such, Russia was obviously not the easiest 
partner for discussions on its possible involvement 
in the ESDP. 
It can therefore be claimed that EU-Russia 
interaction on a joint conceptual framework for 
managing conflicts in the post-Soviet territory is 
largely a story of missed opportunities. Generally, 
tensions relating to the shared neighbourhood have 
been accumulating since 2003. It seems that ‘the 
common neighbourhood’ has become a real litmus 
test that has significantly altered the EU-Russia 
dialogue since 2003. Divergent views between the 
EU and Russia on conflict resolution in Moldova in 
late 2003 were followed by different interpretations 
of the ‘Rose Revolution’ in Georgia (November 
2003) and misunderstandings during the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine one year later. “These 
events highlighted not only divergent perceptions 
but also clashing interests in the neighbourhood” 
(Lynch 2005: 126). A Communication of the 
European Commission (February 2004) notes that 
divergence between EU and Russian positions 
on a number of issues may have implications for 
Russia’s relations with the enlarged EU, including 
for efforts to resolve frozen conflicts. Meanwhile, 
the document recommends that “the EU should 
work with Russia whenever possible to resolve 
frozen conflicts” (European Commission 2004a: 
4). The idea of joint EU-Russian operations in 
the zones of conflict has been advocated by both 
Russian and European experts. While Dmitri 
Trenin proposed the idea of a joint police mission 
specifically for South Ossetia (Trenin 2006: 17), 
Dov Lynch advocated generally a necessity to 
develop a joint conceptual framework for peace 
support operations (Lynch 2005: 135). These 
concerns of the respective expert communities 
seem, however, to have been left on paper and 
have not been utilised by decision makers. 
Cooperation within the CIS, and by extent on 
the unresolved conflicts, has become less and less 
visible on the EU-Russia agenda since 2005. The 
EU and Russia have worked on their own, and have 
not been able to elaborate a common approach for 
conflict management. In such a situation it is no 
wonder that an “urgent interaction channel” to 
handle crises, as the one agreed to by Russia and 
the EU in October 2001 (Allison et al. 2006: 80) 
was not activated on the eve of the August war in 
2008. Thus, the partners only began interacting 
once the conflict had actually boiled over.
The EU’s role and interaction with Russia in 
the August war of 2008
Barbara Lippert warned that “the interest 
profile of the EU, e.g. toward the Southern 
Caucasus, but also toward Belarus and Moldova, 
is still unclear, leading to a situation in which 
the current dynamism of the ENP could rapidly 
flatten and only flare up again at the sign of a 
crisis in the neighbourhood” (Lippert 2007: 20). 
Indeed, the August war in 2008 did become a 
mobilising factor for the EU. French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy, on behalf of the EU Presidency, 
brokered a ceasefire agreement between Georgia 
and Russia. The latter, in turn, agreed to the 
intermediary role of France for two reasons. 
First, Russia and France have a long tradition 
of good bilateral relations. In this sense, it is not 
certain that the EU‘s role as broker would have 
been so successful had another country held the 
EU Presidency. Second, articulating the idea of 
a multi-polar world (a cornerstone of all Russian 
foreign policy documents since the 1990s) Russia 
is not generally inclined to act unilaterally, and 
was quick to accept the EU‘s role in negotiating 
a ceasefire. 
As Emma Stewart notes, “instead of investing 
in conflict prevention, the EU has gone into crisis 
response mode” (Stewart E. 2008b: 3). On 1 
September, 2008, France called an extraordinary 
Council meeting, which took the decision to 
deploy a fact-finding mission to Georgia with 
the task of gathering information and defining 
the modalities for an increased EU commitment 
on the ground, under the ESDP (Council of 
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the European Union 2008: 3). By its decision 
of 2 December, 2008, the Council established 
this mission with Heidi Tagliavani at its Head. 
The result of its work is a lengthy three-volume 
report released in September 2009 (Independent 
International Fact Finding Mission 2008). Without 
going into the details of this work, it is important 
to underline its significance in two respects. 
Firstly, the independent international fact-finding 
mission on the conflict in Georgia was the EU’s 
first mission of this kind. Secondly, the report 
raised both political and legal issues related to the 
conflict, which, according to experts, is essential 
for understanding the dispute.16 
On 8 September, 2008, the EU mediated an 
agreement to hold talks between the conflicting 
parties in Geneva. The ‘Geneva talks’ are chaired 
by an EU/UN/OSCE troika, and divided into two 
working groups – on security and stability, and 
on internally displaced persons and refugees. On 
15 September, 2008, the EU also launched the 
EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), 
which became the fastest in terms of deployment 
and having 330 staff contributed by 26 member 
states. Its core aim is ‘to contribute to long-term 
stability throughout Georgia and the surrounding 
region’, and the mission mandate includes four 
tasks: stabilisation, normalisation, confidence 
building and information. The initial mandate of 
one year was extended until 14 September, 2011 
(EU Council Secretariat 2010).17 Another measure 
was the EU appointment of French diplomat, 
Pierre Morel, as Special Representative in charge 
of conflict resolution in Georgia. This, however, 
duplicated the activities of Peter Semneby who 
remained the EUSR for the South Caucasus 
(Popescu 2009: 469-470). These activities 
confirm the EU’s increased involvement in 
Georgia. However, turning to the practical results 
of this engagement, both EU experts and officials 
underline that the main disappointment with 
regard to the EUMM, for instance, is the monitors’ 
lack of access to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
16 Law office (Global Law Research), interview by author, 26 
January 2010, Berlin, Germany; the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 
interview by author, 9 March 2010, Belgium, Brussels.
17 For a more detailed analysis of the EUMM, see Fischer 2009.
According to EU officials, the EU constantly raises 
this question in discussions with the Russian side 
in Brussels, Moscow, and during sessions of the 
‘Geneva talks’.18 In this regard, the question needs 
to be posed as to what the EU could potentially 
offer if it was able to get access to the breakaway 
entities. The resumption of hostilities is very 
unlikely until both Russia and the EU provide a 
presence on the ground – on the opposing sides 
respectively, to ensure the short-time stabilisation 
of the situation. As far as the long-term task of 
‘conflict settlement’ is concerned, the situation has 
not changed dramatically in comparison to how it 
was before the outbreak of the war. The EU still 
cannot stop the process, which was referred to by 
Bruno Coppieters as “a negative form of conflict 
transformation”, when “the identities and interests 
of the parties are drifting farther and farther apart” 
(Coppieters 2007: 28). It is also very questionable 
whether EU access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
could help to overcome those constraints, which 
have not allowed the EU “to bring the sides closer 
together” at previous stages (Coppieters 2007: 
17). 
The intensity and form of the EU’s attention to 
Georgia after the Caucasus crisis has had quite a 
peculiar dynamic.19 In the five months following 
the five day war, the Council met four times, 
approving relevant conclusions with regard to 
the situation in Georgia while the then HR Javier 
Solana made remarks only once, after his meeting 
with Lado Gurgenidze, Prime Minister of Georgia, 
on 1 September, 2008. The year 2009 was marked 
by one statement from the HR (7 August, 2009), 
Council Conclusions on Georgia (27 July, 2009), 
and one Declaration by the Presidency on the 
situation in Georgia (4 August, 2009). Whereas 
during the first eight months of 2010, the Council 
has not adopted any conclusion or declaration 
with regard to Georgia, Catherin Ashton has made 
two statements, one declaration, and paid a visit 
to Georgia. The first President of the European 
Council Herman Van Rompuy has also made 
18 European Commission and Secretariat of the EU Council, 
interviews by author, 8-9 March 2010, Brussels, Belgium.
19 Cf. report on EU relations with Georgia, available at http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=397&lang=EN, last 
accessed 10 December 2010. .
SPES Policy Papers 2011
29
one statement to the press, confirming the EU‘s 
intention to remain actively involved in confidence 
building measures and conflict resolution (Rompuy 
2010). Therefore, two assumptions can be made in 
this regard: First, the task of conflict settlement in 
the South Caucasus has indeed become a priority 
for the newly elected supranational leaders of the 
EU, as was anticipated by some experts; second, in 
2010, the EU member states (i.e. the Council, and 
particularly Spain as holder of the EU Presidency 
in the first half of 2010) have lost the political 
initiative on policy towards Georgia due to a) the 
absence of an acute crisis situation, which would 
serve as a consolidating factor; b) disagreements 
among themselves on content of possible 
conclusions; or c) acceptance of the situation 
that the High Representative formulates the EU’s 
position on Georgia, and by extension its regional 
conflicts, acting on behalf of the EU. Thus, in this 
particular case, member states are unlikely to curb 
the High Representative’s room for manoeuvre 
as they do in some other cases (Kaszynski et al. 
2010). However, such assumptions about the 
new political balances between the different 
institutions in EU foreign policy making require 
further elaboration, and the issue is beyond the 
focus of this paper.
In sum, the five-day war had a profound impact 
not only on the region, but also on EU-Russia 
relations, and wider European security. Instead of 
elaborating on the negative or even catastrophic 
repercussions of the war and its human, economic 
and social costs for the South Caucasus20, it is here 
important to analyse the consequences of the war 
for EU-Russian joint conflict management and a 
broader European security order.
Repercussions of the August war for the EU-
Russia dialogue on conflict management
As far as EU-Russia interaction in crisis situations 
is concerned, the Caucasus crisis of 2008 has 
highlighted several points. On the positive side is 
the fact that the EU and Russia have shown that 
they are able to search for a compromise and come 
20 On the implications of the conflict for the potential escalation of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict see Ismailzade 2008: 10.
to an agreement even at the peak of a conflict. At 
the same time, the question of leadership inside the 
EU is of particular importance in such situations. 
Secondly, assumptions that Russia sees the CIS 
exclusively as its own backyard and sphere of 
influence are to some extent misleading. Indeed, 
the fact that Russia was willing to accept the EU 
playing an intermediary role during the hot phase 
of this conflict and beyond, indicates that the EU 
could in fact have been more actively engaged in 
previous years. However, as Laure Delcour and 
Elsa Tulmets wrote “the EU has so far failed to 
build bridges between its policies in the former 
USSR owing to its neglecting the role played by 
Russia in the region” (Delcour/Tulmets 2009: 514). 
In this respect, there is also a need to reassess the 
results of the work of previous EU Presidencies. In 
particular, one question might be prompted – why 
Germany, which held the EU Presidency in the first 
half of 2007, did not notice a negative dynamic in 
the escalation in the South Caucasus and did not 
approach Russia on this matter. A peace proposal 
for Abkhazia, initiated by the former German 
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and 
followed up by visits to the breakaway region in 
May/June 2008, were obviously too little. 
On the negative side is the fact that the EU 
and Russia seem not to have learned the lessons 
from the August war. Since then there have been 
five EU-Russia summits, but the issue of joint 
conflict management has not received a higher 
profile in the partners’ relations. While prior to 
the Nice Summit (November 2008), the President 
of the European Commission, José Manuel 
Durao Barroso, said that “the conflict in Georgia 
has emphasised the crucial need for permanent 
political dialogue between the EU and the Russian 
Federation” (European Commission 2008b), 
such dialogue has not been visible at subsequent 
EU-Russia summits in Khabarovsk (June 2009), 
Stockholm (November 2009) and Rostov-on-Don 
(June 2010). According to official press-releases 
from Khabarovsk, the “Russian President spoke 
about the fight against Somali pirates [...] The 
Russian and EU leaders discussed the Middle 
East settlement [...] The situation surrounding 
Afghanistan and Iraq was also addressed [...] 
Georgia was discussed very briefly” (Interfax 
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2009: 22). In Stockholm, talks on the frozen 
conflicts in the common neighbourhood resulted 
in the observation, made by Dmitri Medvedev at 
a press conference afterwards, that “our positions 
on the South Caucasus are different, and we have 
to recognise it openly” (Medvedev 2009a). The 
summits have brought neither a joint declaration 
nor practical results with regard to conflict 
management. Both sides are responsible for the 
lack of progress with regard to the settlement of 
secessionist conflicts. EU policy towards Russia 
is a subject of internal debate among the member 
states, and the lack of coherency complicates the 
task of elaborating conflict resolution strategies, 
which, in Nicu Popescu’s words, “might upset 
Russia” (Popescu 2009: 457). It seems that Russian 
elites do not agree either to what extent and in what 
fields Russia should closely coordinate its foreign 
policy with the EU. But, the crucial explanation 
for the lack of joint work on conflict resolution 
is the fact that neither in Russian nor EU foreign 
policy thinking the issue of conflict settlement in 
the common neighbourhood has been given a top 
priority. Thus, the Russian-Georgian war has not 
pushed Russian and EU decision makers to search 
for practical solutions for managing conflicts in 
the common neighbourhood. 
Meanwhile, the Caucasus crisis has brought 
out a new, more ‘realist’ driven discourse in recent 
academic studies of EU-Russia interaction in 
the Eastern neighbourhood. The EU’s role as a 
normative power in the region and the notion of 
the values’ gap in EU and Russian perceptions 
of processes in the post-Soviet area are less 
articulated in recently published studies. At 
the same time, a considerable body of research 
recognises that EU-Russia relations are driven by 
competition for influence in the post-Soviet space, 
which, according to some papers, has come about 
as a consequence of the ‘big bang’ enlargement 
(Fischer 2008: 4). The results of this competition 
are perceived differently: from commending 
Russia for being an effective power in the region 
(even one wielding soft power!) and calling 
on the EU “to take a leaf out of Russia’s book” 
(Popescu/Wilson 2009: 48) to stating that “the EU 
is asserting itself more strongly in ‘the common 
neighbourhood’ just as Russia’s loss of influence 
starts to become increasingly apparent” (S. Stewart 
2009: 3). It seems very doubtful that “the success 
of Russia’s activism in the neighbourhood shows 
up the weakness of the EU’s approach” (Popescu/
Wilson 2009: 48). Alexey Bogaturov’s conclusion 
is more convincing: “Russia, unlike the US and the 
EU, cannot provide substantial economic benefits 
for the small countries of the region […] Russian 
diplomacy is obviously loosing in competition 
with the EU and the US, and cannot slow down 
the process of their power consolidation in the 
region” (Bogaturov 2008). At the same time, the 
competition discourse does not discourage experts 
from making recommendations that the EU and 
Russia seek to cooperate with each other wherever 
possible and contribute equally to shaping a 
broader European security architecture.
Impact of the August war on debates about an 
evolving model of European security 
The Russian-Georgian war has obviously 
stimulated talk on the reconstruction of the 
European security architecture – both among 
academics and decision-makers. Again, it remains 
to be seen if something practicable will result from 
President Medvedev’s initiative to create a new 
pan-European security architecture (Medvedev 
2009b). Originally, experts assessed his proposals 
as “generally still quite vague” (Klein 2009: 7; 
Lukyanov 2009: 3), and EU officials described it 
as “a bizarre draft as if from the 19th century”21. 
Meanwhile, the Russian initiative has definitely 
had an impact on similar discussions in Europe, 
where alternatives to the Medvedev plan are most 
certainly under construction, both at the expert 
level and in the political realm. 
The recent proposal made by German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian President 
Dmitri Medvedev in Meseberg should be viewed 
as a further elaboration of the European security 
model. The Meseberg Memorandum suggests 
exploring “the establishment of an EU-Russia 
Political and Security Committee (ER PSC) 
on the ministerial level (HR C. Ashton – FM S. 
Lavrov)”. In particular, the new structure should 
21 European Commission and Secretariat of the EU Council, 
interviews by author, 8-9 March 2010, Brussels, Belgium.
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establish rules for joint EU-Russia civil/military 
crisis management operations, exchange views 
and draft recommendations on various conflicts 
and crisis situations. In particular, the document 
envisages cooperation in finding a resolution 
for the Transnistria conflict (Merkel/Medvedev 
2010a). The proposal is significant in two respects. 
First, the European leaders are considering more 
practical and rapid mechanisms to resolve security 
issues. Second, the initiative was put forward by 
one member state. As Angela Merkel claimed 
“there are situations when one particular EU 
member country discusses this or that issue in 
more detail, and this is just one of the EU’s work 
methods. It would be very complicated and not 
very realistic to expect all 27 EU members to 
reach agreement among themselves, and only then 
present this or that initiative to Russia” (Merkel/
Medvedev 2010b). As is clearly shown in the 
above quotation, it is still a challenge for the EU 
to design a coherent vision with regard to Russia 
and how to deal with it. Thus, it is unclear if the 
proposed initiative will receive the approval of the 
Council. 
The future of a European security architecture 
has also been discussed in several studies 
conducted by policy analysists after the August 
war. They recognise that European security has 
been guaranteed primarily by NATO and the EU, 
and that Russia is not included in this traditional 
system of institutions. Therefore, the Caucasus 
crisis should be the turning point for redesigning 
the European order with the aim of engaging Russia 
(Schroeder 2008: 5; Dembinski, et al. 2008: 24-
25; E. Stewart 2008b: 3; Delcour/Tulmets 2009: 
516). “Renewed cooperation”, “rapprochement” 
or a “grand bargain with Russia” should rest on 
the OSCE in its present form (E. Stewart 2008b: 
3), or on a revived one – practically achievable by 
signing “Helsinki-2” (Dembinski, et al. 2008: 26; 
Bogaturov 2008). Others call for the creation of 
a completely new European security architecture, 
since “the existing structures – NATO, EU, OSCE 
and CIS – are plainly unable to prevent conflict 
between hostile countries” (Schroeder 2008: 6).     
To sum up, although it is difficult to see any 
demonstrable progress in EU-Russian interaction 
on conflict management after the Caucasus crisis, 
the issue is touched upon in the context of broader 
discussions on the evolving system of European 
security.
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Conclusions
This paper has conducted a joint analysis of both 
EU and Russian policies towards the conflicts 
and explored their attempts to include the issue 
of conflict management on the common political 
agenda.
As the first chapter found, although Russia 
has made several attempts (especially evident in 
the case of Transnistria and recently Nagorno-
Karabakh) to change the status quo and suggest 
some plans for conflict settlement, these moves 
were quite reluctant, and did not break the 
negotiation deadlock in any of the four cases. 
Instead of working on potential scenarios for 
the political resolution of the conflicts, Russia 
invested much (both rhetorically and in practice) 
in defending its right to remain in the zones of 
conflicts.  
The second chapter looked at the EU’s policies 
towards the conflicts and argues that despite the 
passive Russian approach to the task of political 
conflict resolution, the EU has not elaborated any 
plans for conflict settlement either. Despite having 
a number of instruments for conflict management 
at its disposal, the EU has mainly used these to 
make general statements concerning the need for 
conflict settlement in the Eastern neighbourhood. 
These are reflected in a number of EU documents. 
However, the EU has faced certain internal and 
external challenges to its actual policies towards the 
protracted conflicts. A number of academic studies 
stress the role of ‘the Russian factor’, namely, that 
the EU has been hesitant to clash with Russia in 
its traditional ‘zone of influence’. This hesitance 
is said to explain the EU’s cautious engagement. 
However, this paper argues that the EU was not 
informed by real Russian policy in the common 
neighbourhood, but more by one constructed in 
accordance with European perceptions of Russia’s 
rhetoric. If there had been a serious assessment of 
Russian foreign policy towards its ‘near abroad’, 
the absence of a consistent and well thought-out 
policy would have become evident. 
Thus, one may conclude that both the EU and 
Russia fulfilled the task of conflict management 
in the common neighbourhood only partly: they 
acted as mediators, and tried to avoid re-escalation 
of the conflicts. Meanwhile, both actors invested 
little in the search for a political resolution of 
these conflicts. While the EU has seen its role 
primarily in providing economic assistance and 
supporting existing negotiation formats, Russia 
has constantly justified the necessity to keep its 
peacekeeping forces in the zones of conflict. 
However, a consistent long-term strategy for 
political conflict settlement has been absent in both 
EU and Russian policies towards the region. This 
analysis confirms that, until the August war, both 
actors seemed to be less interested in searching 
for a means of conflict resolution per se, but rather 
in avoiding the negative consequences of their 
possible re-escalation. This may be illustrated by 
the fact that before the Caucasus crisis of 2008, 
conflict settlement in the common neighbourhood 
had not been an urgent issue, deserving special 
attention, in either Russian or EU foreign policy 
thinking.
Therefore, while the EU and Russia are often 
characterised as the two poles of Europe (Marsh 
2008: 201), with obvious differences on a number 
of issues, their approach to conflict management 
in the post-Soviet territory has certain similarities. 
The following comparison will sum up these 
similarities, which have turned out to be 
fundamental weaknesses in the strategies of both 
actors. 
First, for a certain period of time (albeit 
for different reasons), the EU and Russia were 
interested in maintaining the status quo in the 
conflict regions. The EU instruments of ‘projecting 
stability’ were expected to bring results in the long 
run, so any negative dynamics would undermine 
the effectiveness of the EU’s work. In turn, 
Russia mistakenly believed that the presence of 
its peace keeping contingents would enable it to 
keep the conflicts under control, and additionally 
provide it with a certain political leverage over its 
neighbours.
Second, both the EU and Russia have 
demonstrated different involvement in the four 
conflicts. The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh 
has received less engagement from both actors, 
although it has the potential to be the most 
dangerous in the case of a re-escalation. Both the 
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EU and Russia have paid more attention to the 
conflicts in Transnistria and South Ossetia as these 
seemed to them to be the most solvable.
Third, neither the EU nor Russia has managed 
to provide a forum for equal dialogue between the 
conflicting parties. While Russia has preferred 
to support breakaway entities, the EU has 
worked more closely with central authorities, 
ignoring separatists. Such strategies have been 
counterproductive for building confidence among 
the authorities and the secessionists, and cannot be 
seen as a step on the way to conflict settlement.
Fourth, the EU and Russia have widely 
debated the possibilities of launching or keeping 
their respective missions in the zones of conflicts. 
Thus, both actors have obviously prioritised short-
term instruments over long-term political dialogue 
for conflict resolution.    
The third chapter aimed at analysing the 
EU-Russia dialogue on conflict management. 
It concluded that such interaction has not 
brought any practical solutions either. Again, it 
is important to underline that the EU and Russia 
have prioritised other issues in their relations, and 
that there was little interest in a political resolution 
of the conflicts. Therefore, despite formalised 
consultations on the matter and declarations of 
possible joint actions, the partners did not have 
the political will and motivation to suggest any 
workable plans to ensure the settlement of the 
conflicts in the shared neighbourhood. This is the 
main factor having negative consequences for 
joint diplomacy. 
Along with this, the paper has also taken other 
factors into consideration, which have hindered 
the partners’ cooperation with regard to the shared 
neighbourhood and its conflicts. In particular, while 
the EU lacks internal cohesion vis-à-vis Moscow, 
Russia underestimates the ability of Brussels to 
act in the domain of common foreign policy. In 
addition, the existence of competition for influence 
in the post-Soviet space (especially evident since 
2003/04) is not to be underestimated.
The result of such interaction has been the 
limited influence on the part of both actors on 
the conflict in South Ossetia. The EU turned out 
to be unable (and Russia unwilling) to prevent 
the escalation of the conflict in August 2008. In 
clashing with Georgia, Russia openly became 
a part of the conflict. The EU played a crucial 
intermediary role to stop the war, proving that it 
acted more efficiently and coherently under the 
crisis situation. Although somewhat paradoxical, 
one of the immediate lessons from the Caucasus 
crisis, made by many experts and practitioners 
both in the West and Russia, relates to the need 
for an EU-Russian joint approach to conflict 
management in the region. This paper takes a 
similar approach, but argues that it is important to 
stay realistic about the scope of such cooperation.
The issue of joint conflict management has two 
dimensions: substance and form. Although ideally 
it would be preferable to find common ground or 
a universal formula for addressing all secessionist 
conflicts (as advocated by some legal scholars22), 
this task is politically unfeasible. The conflicts 
are too complex and divisive, all the more so as 
they are all at different stages of development. 
Thus, the EU and Russia should develop separate 
dialogues and policy options for each conflict. 
The most difficult cases are South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia. Despite the argument that the 
Kosovar sovereignty dispute was unique, it was 
short-sighted not to foresee an obvious ‘domino 
effect’, produced by Kosovar sovereignty on the 
post-Soviet conflicts. International recognition 
of Kosovo became a signal for those involved 
in other conflicts to attempt to change the status 
quo, thus unfreezing the conflicts in negative 
terms. As soon as self-proclaimed independence 
is recognised by any regional or global powers, 
this becomes a matter of international politics, and 
an element of ‘big play’ among key actors rather 
than a dispute between a state and its breakaway 
entity. No actor (whether the US, Russia or the 
EU) would question its international reputation, 
and call back its recognition. On the other hand, 
it is unlikely that the other key players would risk 
supporting a struggle for the return of a breakaway 
region when its independence has already been 
recognised by an influential sponsor. This means 
that the cases of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia are practically irreversible. Thus, we are 
22 Law office (Global Law Research), interview by author, 26 
January 2010, Berlin, Germany. 
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witnessing the creation of a new divide when 
particular regions are recognised by some key 
international actors and renounced by others. 
Such precedents of establishing parallel systems 
of norms and principles (under the supervision of 
the strongest countries) are highly dangerous for 
security and stability in Europe and worldwide.
What options are available for the EU and 
Russia? At the moment, the political resolution 
of the conflicts in Georgia has little chance for 
success, as the ‘Geneva talks’ are demonstrating. 
Thus, Russia and the EU can only work to prevent 
any new escalation in the unstable region of the 
South Caucasus. This could be done by deploying 
parallel peacekeeping missions – the EU’s mission 
in Georgia proper, and the Russian mission 
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (as it is well 
known, the Russian military is stationed in both 
breakaway entities). Any economic assistance for 
all three republics – whether by the EU or Russia 
(and ideally by any third donor) must be a subject 
to strict conditionality aimed at preventing new 
clashes.
However, potentially the other two conflicts 
– in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh – 
can be approached jointly by the EU and 
Russia. Both actors remain key players in the 
established negotiation formats, and may have 
sufficient political leverage in suggesting plans 
for settlement. However, as the Caucasus crisis 
revealed, real (versus rhetorical) EU-Russian 
relations are ‘conflict-driven’. The EU and Russia 
should learn how to develop an effective dialogue 
on a regular basis, and not just under the pressure 
of crisis. The recent initiative of Angela Merkel 
and Dmitri Medvedev to establish a joint Political 
and Security Committee may be a step that 
will help to develop more practical and regular 
mechanisms of consultations on security issues.
The EU and Russia should develop 
comprehensive strategies for a phased conflict 
settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria. 
Similar to the EU-Russia energy dialogue, 
the partners could establish dialogues (with 
respective coordinators) on each conflict. 
Russia should also consider the possibility of 
appointing special representatives to Moldova 
and the South Caucasus (similar to the EUSR) 
with a mandate for close interaction with their 
respective EU counterpart. The Russian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (and Russia’s Mission to the 
EU in Brussels, respectively) should intensify its 
consultations on the issue with the relevant EU 
institutions. The work of EU-Russia summits 
should also be redesigned to be structured around 
a series of topic-oriented forums, including on the 
regional conflicts. 
But, even more important is to give substance 
to the EU-Russian consultations. Together with 
institutionalised channels, which are still important 
in external relations, a space should be created for 
more informal and precise discussions. As one EU 
official claimed, there are too many formalised 
meetings between the EU and Russia and holding 
two summits per year is not productive either. 
The dialogue can be led with less choreography 
(i.e. less planned meetings, rigid structures and 
institutions), and more on an ad hoc basis if 
something important happens.23 Moreover, it 
should be more open to experts and the general 
public. 
The existence of a joint conceptual framework 
for conflict settlement would also be an advantage 
for the conflicting parties. When the EU and 
Russia come with one single answer, they will 
not be damaged by competing plans for conflict 
resolution. A joint EU-Russia approach can be 
viewed as an important element of confidence 
building. However, to find such a solution, the 
EU and Russia should work both with central and 
secessionist governments.
After devising a joint strategy, Russia and 
the EU could try to coordinate on such sensitive 
issues as joint peacekeeping missions for the post 
settlement period. If the existing formats (ESDP 
or Russia’s peacekeeping practice) do not allow 
for a solution to the problem of ‘equality’ in 
decision-making, then the partners should explore 
other modalities (division of responsibilities, 
establishing formats for certain missions on an ad 
hoc basis). 
Finally, the respective expert communities of 
Russia and the EU should develop better expertise 
23 Secretariat of the EU Council, interviews by author, 8 March 
2010, Brussels, Belgium.
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in the regional policies of the other in order to 
bridge the gap in the perception and understanding 
of their counterpart’s actions.  
To sum up, it is in the mutual interest of the 
EU and Russia to coordinate their answers to 
security challenges on the European continent. 
Reconstructing a pan-European security 
architecture is an ambitious but time consuming 
project. Furthermore, institutional agreements do 
not necessarily lead to the bridging of differences. 
Not excluding the possibility of a completely new 
European security system in the future, Russia and 
the EU should work further within the existing 
structures. It is also important to give substance 
to EU-Russian negotiations on various levels, 
to make them open to a wider audience. Precise 
decisions for the current problems (including the 
unresolved conflicts) should not be lost in the 
discussions of grand, ambitious but fuzzy projects 
such as creating a new pan-European security 
architecture.
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